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Florida v. Jardines 
11-564 
Ruling Below: lardines v. State, 73 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted in part, Florida v. 
lardines, 11-564 (132 S.Ct. 995). 
In 2006, police received a tip that Joelis Jm'dines was using his home as a place to grow 
marijuana. The police took a drug-sniffing dog to his door and when it had indicated that it 
smelled drugs a police officer approached the door and smelled marijuana. The police obtained a 
search warrant and later found several marijuana plants inside Jardines' home. Jardines was 
charged with drug trafficking and other charges. In 2007, Jardines filed a Motion to Suppress 
Items Seized from His Home arguing that the use of the dog was an unreasonable search. The 
court granted the motion and the State appealed. The District Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the use of the dog did not constitute a search. 
Question Presented: Whether a "sniff test" by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door 
of a private residence is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 
Joelis JARDINES, Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE of Florida, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Florida 
Decided April 14, 2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnote and citation omitted.] 
PERRY, J. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On November 3, 2006, Detective Pedraja of 
the Miami-Dade Police Department 
received an unverified "crime stoppers" tip 
that the home of Joelis Jardines was being 
used to grow marijuana. One month later, on 
December 6, 2006, Detective Pedraja and 
Detective Bartlet and his drug detection dog, 
Franky, approached the residence. 
The handler placed the dog on a leash and 
accompanied the dog up to the front door of 
the home. The dog alerted to the scent of 
contraband. 
The handler told the detective that the dog 
had a positive alert for the odor of narcotics. 
The detective went up to the front door for 
the first time, and smelled marijuana. 
The detective prepared an affidavit and 
applied for a search warrant, which was 
issued. A search was conducted, which 
confirmed that marijuana was being grown 
inside the home. The defendant was 
arrested. 
The defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized at his home. The trial cOUli 
351 
conducted an evidentiary hearing at which 
the detective and the dog handler testified. 
The trial court suppressed the evidence on 
authority of State v. Rabb. 
The State appealed the suppression ruling, 
and the district court reversed based on the 
following reasoning: 
In sum, we reverse the order 
suppressing the evidence at issue. 
We conclude that no illegal search 
occurred. The officer had the right to 
go up to defendant's front door. 
Contrary to the holding in Rabb, a 
warrant was not necessary for the 
drug dog sniff, and the officer's sniff 
at the exterior door of defendant's 
home should not have been viewed 
as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The 
trial judge should have concluded 
substantial evidence suppOlied the 
magistrate's determination that 
probable cause existed. Moreover, 
the evidence at issue should not have 
been suppressed because its 
discovery was inevitable. To the 
extent our analysis conflicts with 
Rabb, we certify direct conflict. 
Jm'dines sought review in this Court based 
on certified conflict with State v. Rabb, 920 
So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which we 
granted. 
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution contains both the Search and 
Seizure Clause and the Warrant Clause and 
provides as follows in full: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. With respect to the 
meaning of the amendment, the courts have 
come to accept the formulation set forth by 
Justice Harlan in Katz: 
As the Court's opinion states, "the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places." The question, however, 
is what protection it affords to those 
people. Generally, as here, the 
answer to that question requires 
reference to a "place." My 
1Inderstanding of the rule that has 
emerged.fi'om prior decisions is that 
there is a !vvofold req1lirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, secone/, that the 
expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 
"reasonable. " 
A. Federal "Dog Sniff" Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has 
addressed the issue of "sniff tests" by drug 
detection dogs. First, in United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), that Court 
addressed the issue of whether police, based 
on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily 
seize a piece of luggage at an airport and 
then subject the luggage to a "sniff test" by a 
drug detection dog. After Place's behavior at 
an airport aroused suspicion, police seized 
his luggage and subjected it to a "sniff test" 
by a drug detection dog at another airport 
and ultimately discovered cocaine inside. 
The federal district couli denied Place's 
motion to suppress, and the court of appeals 
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reversed. The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed, concluding that the seizure, which 
lasted ninety minutes, was an impermissibly 
long Terry stop, but the COUli ruled as 
follows with respect to the dog "sniff test": 
The FOUlih Amendment "protects people 
from unreasonable government intrusions 
into their legitimate expectations of 
privacy." We have affirmed that a person 
possesses a privacy interest in the contents 
of personal luggage that is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. A "canine sniff' by a 
well-trained narcotics detection dog, 
however, does not require opening the 
luggage. It does not expose noncontraband 
items that otherwise would remain hidden 
from public view, as does, for example, an 
officer's rummaging through the contents of 
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which 
information IS obtained through this 
investigative technique is much less 
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, 
the sniff discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. 
Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the 
authorities something about the contents of 
the luggage, the information obtained is 
limited. This limited disclosure also ensures 
that the owner of the property is not 
subjected to the embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate 
and more intrusive investigative methods. 
In these respects, the canine sniff is s1li 
generis. We are aware of no other 
investigative procedure that is so limited 
both in the manner in which the information 
is obtained and in the content of the 
information revealed by the procedure. 
Therefore, we conclude that the particular 
course of investigation that the agents 
intended to pursue here-exposure of 
respondent's luggage, which was located in 
a public place, to a trained canine-did not 
constitute a "search" within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmon(l, 
531 U.S. 32 (2000), the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether police could stop a vehicle at a drug 
interdiction checkpoint and subject the 
exterior of the vehicle to a "sniff test" by a 
drug detection dog. Police stopped Edmond 
and other motorists at a dragnet-style drug 
interdiction checkpoint, and a drug detection 
dog was walked around the exterior of each 
vehicle. Later, Edmond filed a class action 
lawsuit against the city, claiming that the 
checkpoints violated his FOUlih Amendment 
rights, and he sought a preliminary 
injunction barring the practice. The federal 
district court denied the injunction, and the 
court of appeals reversed. The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that 
"[ w]e have never approved a checkpoint 
program whose primary purpose was to 
detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 
S.Ct. 447. With respect to the dog "sniff 
test," the Court stated as follows: 
It is well established that a vehicle stop at a 
highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The fact that officers walk a 
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior 
of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints 
does not transform the seizure into a search. 
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an 
automobile does not require entry into the 
car and is not designed to disclose any 
information other than the presence or 
absence of narcotics. Like the dog sniff in 
Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks 
around a car is "much less intrusive than a 
typical search." 
B. Two Additional Federal Cases 
In two additional cases, the United States 
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Supreme Court has addressed Fourth 
Amendment issues that are relevant here. 
First, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109 (1984), the Court addressed the issue of 
whether police, without a showing of 
probable cause, could temporarily seize and 
inspect a small portion of the contents of a 
package, which had been damaged in transit 
and was being held by a private shipping 
company, and then subject the contents to a 
field test for cocaine. After employees of a 
private freight carrier discovered a 
suspicious white powder in a damaged 
package and notified federal agents, the 
agents conducted a field chemical test on the 
powder and determined that it was cocaine. 
The federal district court denied Jacobsen's 
motion to suppress, and the court of appeals 
reversed. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, reasoning as follows: 
A chemical test that merely discloses 
whether or not a particular substance 
is cocaine does not compromise any 
legitimate interest in privacy. This 
conclusion is not dependent on the 
result of any particular test. It is 
probably safe to assume that 
virtually all of the tests conducted 
under circumstances comparable to 
those disclosed by this record would 
result in a positive finding; in such 
cases, no legitimate interest has been 
compromised. But even if the results 
are negative-merely disclosing that 
the substance is something other than 
cocaine-such a result reveals 
nothing of special interest. Congress 
has decided-and there IS no 
question about its power to do so-to 
treat the interest in "privately" 
possessing cocaine as illegitimate; 
thus governmental conduct that can 
reveal whether a substance is 
coca me, and no other arguably 
"private" fact, compromises no 
legitimate privacy interest. 
This conclusion is dictated by United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), in which the 
Court held that subjecting luggage to a 
"sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection 
dog was not a "search" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. ... 
Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official 
conduct of the kind disclosed by the record 
will actually compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy seems much too remote to 
characterize the testing as a search subject to 
the Fourth Amendment. 
And second, in Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether police, 
without a warrant, could use a thermal-
imaging device to scan a private home to 
determine if the amount of heat generated by 
the home was consistent with the use of 
high-intensity lamps used in growing 
marijuana. After federal agents became 
SUSpICIOUS that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana in his home, agents scanned the 
outside of the triplex with a thermal-imaging 
device, which showed that the garage roof 
and side of the residence were inordinately 
warm. The agents obtained a warrant and 
searched the residence and found live 
marijuana plants inside. The federal district 
court denied Kyllo's motion to suppress, and 
the circuit court affirmed. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning as 
follows: 
The Katz test-whether the 
individual has an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable-has often 
been criticized as circular, and hence 
subjective and unpredictable. While 
it may be difficult to refine Katz 
when the search of areas such as 
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telephone booths, automobiles, or 
even the curtilage and uncovered 
portions of residences is at issue, in 
the case of the search of the interior 
of homes-the prototypical and 
hence most commonly litigated area 
of protected privacy-there is a 
ready criterion, with roots deep in 
the common law, of the minimal 
expectation of privacy that exists, 
and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable. To withdraw protection 
of this minimum expectation would 
be to permit police technology to 
erode the privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment. We think that 
obtaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical "intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected 
area" constitutes a search-at least 
where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use. 
This assures preservation of that 
degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted. On 
the basis of this criterion, the 
information obtained by the thermal 
imager in this case was the product 
ofa search .... 
We have said that the Fourth Amendment 
draws "a firm line at the entrance to the 
house." That line, we think, must be not 
only firm but also bright-which requires 
clear specification of those methods of 
surveillance that require a warrant. While it 
is certainly possible to conclude from the 
videotape of the thermal imaging that 
occurred in this case that no "significant" 
compromise of the homeowner's privacy 
has occurred, we must take the long view, 
from the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment forward. 
"The Fourth Amendment is to be construed 
in the light of what was deemed an 
unreasonable search and seizure when it was 
adopted, and in a manner which will 
conserve public interests as well as the 
interests and rights of individual citizens." 
Where, as here, the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
"search" and is presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant. 
III. ANALYSIS 
As noted above, the issue raised in the 
present case is whether a "sniff test" by a 
drug detection dog conducted at the front 
door of a private residence is a "search" 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Federal "Dog Sniff' Cases Are 
Inapplicable to the Home 
For reasons explained below, we conclude 
that the analysis used in the above federal 
"dog sniff' cases is inapplicable to a "sniff 
test" conducted at a private home. First, we 
recognize that the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that because a "sniff test" 
conducted by a drug detection dog is "sui 
generis," or unique, in the sense that it is 
minimally intrusive and is designed to detect 
only illicit drugs and nothing more, Place, 
462 U.S. at 707, a dog "sniff test" does not 
implicate Fourth Amendment rights when 
employed in the following settings: (i) when 
conducted on luggage that has been seized at 
an airport based on reasonable suspicion of 
unlawful activity, where the luggage has 
been separated from its owner and the "sniff 
test" is conducted in a public place, (ii) 
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when conducted on the exterior of a vehicle 
that has been stopped in a dragnet-style stop 
at a drug interdiction checkpoint, and (iii) 
when conducted on the exterior of a vehicle 
that has been subjected to a lawful traffic 
stop. Fmiher, the United States Supreme 
Court has applied a similar analysis to a 
chemical "field test" for drugs when 
conducted on the contents of a package that 
has been damaged in transit and is being 
held by a private shipping company. 
We note, however, that in each of the above 
cases, the United States Supreme Court was 
careful to tie its ruling to the particular facts 
of the case. Nothing in the above cases 
indicates that the same analysis would apply 
to a dog "sniff test" conducted at a private 
residence. 
Significantly, all the sniff and field tests in 
the above cases were conducted in a 
minimally intrusive manner upon objects-
luggage at an airport in Place, vehicles on 
the roadside in Edmond that warrant no 
special protection under the Fourth 
Amendment. All the tests were conducted in 
an impersonal manner that subjected the 
defendants to no untoward level of public 
opprobrium, humiliation or embarrassment. 
There was no public link between the 
defendants and the luggage as it was being 
tested in Place and the defendants retained a 
degree of anonymity during the roadside 
testing of their vehicles in Edmond. Further, 
and more impOliant, under the patiicular 
circumstances of each of the above cases, 
the tests were not susceptible to being 
employed in a discriminatory or arbitrary 
manner-the luggage in Place had been 
seized based on reasonable suspicion; the 
vehicle in Edmond had been seized in a 
dragnet-style stop. All these objects were 
seized and tested in an objective and 
nondiscriminatory manner, and there was no 
evidence of overbearing or harassing 
government conduct. There was no need for 
Fourth Amendment protection. As explained 
below, however, such is not the case with 
respect to a dog "sniff test" conducted at a 
private residence. 
B. "Sniff Test" at a Private Home 
As noted above, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that "wherever an individual 
may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of 
privacy,' he is entitled to be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion." Terry, 
392 U.S. at 9. Nowhere is this right more 
resolute than in the private home: "'At the 
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands 
the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.'" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 
31. 
Although police generally may initiate a 
"knock and talk" encounter at the front door 
of a private residence without any prior 
showing of wrongdoing, a dog "sniff test" is 
a qualitatively different matter. Contrary to 
popular belief, a "sniff test" conducted at a 
private residence is not necessarily a casual 
affair in which a canine officer and dog 
approach the front door and the dog then 
performs a subtle "sniff test" and signals an 
"alert" if drugs are detected. Quite the 
contrary. In the present case, for instance, on 
the morning of December 5, 2006, members 
of the Miami-Dade Police Depatiment, 
Narcotics Bureau, and agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), United 
States Depatiment of Justice, conducted a 
surveillance of Jat'dines' home. As 
Detectives Pedraja and Batilet and the drug 
detection dog, Franky, approached the 
residence, Sergeant Ramirez and Detective 
Donnelly of the Miami-Dade Police 
Department established perimeter positions 
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around the residence and federal DEA 
agents assumed stand-by positions as 
backup units. 
The "sniff test" conducted by the dog 
handler and his dog was a vigorous and 
intensive procedure. 
After the "sniff test" was completed, 
Detective Bartlet and Franky left the scene 
to assist in another case. Detective Pedraja, 
after waiting at the residence for fifteen or 
twenty minutes, also left the scene to 
prepare a search warrant and to submit it to 
a magistrate. Federal DEA agents, however, 
remained behind to maintain surveillance of 
lardines' home. Pedraja obtained a search 
warrant later that day and returned to the 
scene. About an hour later, members of the 
Miami-Dade Police Department, Narcotics 
Bureau, and DEA agents executed the 
warrant by gaining entry to lardines' home 
through the front door. As agents entered the 
front door, lardines exited through a sliding 
glass door at the rear of the house. He was 
apprehended by Special Agent Wilson of the 
DEA and was turned over to the Miami-
Dade Police Department. He was charged 
with trafficking in marijuana and theft of 
electricity. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
the dog "sniff test" that was conducted here 
was an intrusive procedure. The "sniff test" 
was a sophisticated undertaking that was the 
end result of a sustained and coordinated 
effort by various law enforcement 
departments. On the scene, the procedure 
involved multiple police vehicles, multiple 
law enforcement personnel, including 
narcotics detectives and other officers, and 
an experienced dog handler and trained drug 
detection dog engaged in a vigorous search 
effort on the front porch of the residence. 
Tactical law enforcement personnel from 
various government agencies, both state and 
federal, were on the scene for surveillance 
and backup purposes. The entire on-the-
scene government activity-i.e., the 
preparation for the "sniff test," the test itself, 
and the aftermath, which culminated in the 
full-blown search of lardines' home-lasted 
for hours. The "sniff test" apparently took 
place in plain view of the general public. 
There was no anonymity for the resident. 
Such a public spectacle unfolding in a 
residential neighborhood will invariably 
entail a degree of public opprobrium, 
humiliation and embarrassment for the 
resident, whether or not he or she is present 
at the time of the search, for such dramatic 
government activity in the eyes of many-
neighbors, passers-by, and the public at 
large-will be viewed as an official 
accusation of crime. And if the resident 
happens to be present at the time of the 
"sniff test," such an intrusion into the 
sanctity of his or her home will generally be 
a frightening and harrowing experience that 
could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable 
response. 
Further, all the underlying circumstances 
that were present in the above federal "dog 
sniff' and "field test" cases that guaranteed 
objective, uniform application of those 
tests-i.e., the temporary seizure of luggage 
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity in Place; the temporary seizure of a 
vehicle in a dragnet-style stop at a drug 
interdiction checkpoint in Edmond. Unlike 
the objects in those cases, a private 
residence is not susceptible to being seized 
beforehand based on objective criteria. 
Thus, if government agents can conduct a 
dog "sniff test" at a private residence 
without any prior evidentiary showing of 
wrongdoing, there is simply nothing to 
prevent the agents from applying the 
procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
manner, or based on whim and fancy, at the 
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home of any citizen. Such an open-ended 
policy invites overbearing and harassing 
conduct. 
In sum, a "sniff test" by a drug detection dog 
conducted at a private residence does not 
only reveal the presence of contraband, as 
was the case in the federal "sui generis" dog 
sniff cases discussed above, but it also 
constitutes an intmsive procedure that may 
expose the resident to public opprobrium, 
humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises 
the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Given the special status 
accorded a citizen's home under the Fourth 
Amendment, we conclude that a "sniff test," 
such as the test that was conducted in the 
present case, is a substantial government 
intrusion into the sanctity of the home and 
constitutes a "search" within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. As such, it warrants 
the safeguards that inhere in that 
amendment-specifically, the search must 
be preceded by an evidentiary showing of 
wrongdoing. We note that the rulings of 
other state and federal courts with respect to 
a dog "sniff test" conducted at a private 
residence are generally mixed, as are the 
rulings of other state and federal courts with 
respect a dog "sniff test" conducted at an 
apartment or other temporary dwelling. 
IV. THE SUPPRESSION RULING 
A magistrate's determination that probable 
cause exists for issuance of a search warrant 
is entitled to great deference when a trial 
court is considering a motion to suppress. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 
(1983) And a trial comt's ruling on a motion 
to suppress in such a case is subject to the 
following standard of review: the reviewing 
court must defer to the trial court's factual 
findings if supported by competent, 
substantial evidence but must review the 
trial court's ultimate ruling independently, 
or de novo. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 
297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.200 1). 
With respect to the fact that Detective 
Pedraja testified that he smelled the odor of 
live marijuana plants as he stood outside the 
front door of Jardines' house, the trial court 
stated as follows in a footnote: "There was 
evidence that after the drug detection dog 
had alerted to the odor of a controlled 
substance, the officer also detected a smell 
of marijuana plants emanating from the front 
door. However, this information was only 
confirming what the detection dog had 
already revealed." 
A warrantless "sniff test" by a dmg 
detection dog conducted at the front door of 
a private residence is impermissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the trial court 
properly excluded the results of the "sniff 
test" from its review of the magistrate's 
probable cause determination. The 
remammg evidence consisted of the 
following: the unverified "crime stoppers" 
tip, the closed window blinds, and the 
constantly running air conditioner. As for 
Detective Pedraja's statement that he 
detected the odor of live marijuana plants as 
he stood outside the front door, we note that 
the trial court had the opportunity to observe 
Detective Pedraja's testimony first-hand at 
the suppression hearing. Fmther, the district 
court in Rabb addressed an identical 
situation and concluded as follows: 
[B]ecause the chronology of the 
probable cause affidavit suggests that 
the dog alert to marijuana occurred 
prior to law enforcement's detection 
of its odor, we cannot assume that 
law enforcement detected the odor of 
marijuana before the dog alerted .... 
As such, this is not a case in which a 
law enforcement officer used his 
senses to detect something within his 
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plain smell; rather, a law 
enforcement officer used enhanced, 
animal senses to detect something 
inside a home that he might not 
otherwise have detected. 
Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1191. Based on our 
review of the present record, we conclude 
that the trial court's factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial 
evidence and the trial court's ultimate ruling 
is supported in the law. The district court 
erred in reversing the suppression ruling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
"We have said that the Fourth Amendment 
draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the 
house.' That line, we think, must be not only 
firm but also bright-which requires clear 
specification of those methods of 
surveillance that require a wanant." Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 40. Given the special status 
accorded a citizen's home in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, we hold that the 
wanantless "sniff test" that was conducted 
at the front door of the residence in the 
present case was an unreasonable 
government intrusion into the sanctity of the 
home and violated the Fourth Amendment. 
We quash the decision in lardines and 
approve the result in Rabb. 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
Because the majority's decision violates 
binding United States Supreme Court 
precedent, I respectfully dissent. 
Despite the majority's focus upon multiple 
officers and the supposed time involved in 
surveillance and in execution of the search 
warrant, it is undisputed that one dog and 
two officers were lawfully and briefly 
present near the front door of lardines' 
residence when the dog sniff at issue in this 
case took place. And despite statements 
about privacy interests in items and odors 
within and escaping from a home, the 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
there are no legitimate privacy interests III 
contraband under the Fourth Amendment. 
Contrary to the majority's position, the 
United States Supreme COUli has ruled that 
a dog sniff is not a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 
a dog sniff only reveals contraband in which 
there is no legitimate privacy interest. 
Accordingly, the dog sniff involved in this 
case, which occurred while law enforcement 
was lawfully present at the front door, 
cannot be considered a search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
I. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 
The similar right contained in the Florida 
Constitution is "construed in confonnity 
with the 4th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court." Art. I, § 12, 
Fla. Const. Therefore, this Court's 
jurisprudence in this area must conform to 
the United States Supreme Court's 
precedent interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In this case, it is undisputed that law 
enforcement was lawfully present at 
lardines' front door. While the Fourth 
Amendment certainly protects "the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental 
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intrusion," Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 511 (1961), the publicly accessible 
area around the front door of the home is not 
accorded the same degree of Fourth 
Amendment protection. In fact, the majority 
acknow ledges that "one does not harbor an 
expectation of privacy on a front porch 
where salesmen or visitors may appear at 
any time." Majority op. at 46. 
Furthermore, there are no allegations here 
that an officer's detection of the scent of 
marijuana while lawfully present at 
Jardines' front door would have violated the 
Fourth Amendment. There are no such 
allegations because "the police may see 
what may be seen 'from a public vantage 
point where [they have] a right to be. '" 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989). 
Or, as the Ninth Circuit plainly put it with 
regard to the sense of smell, one does not 
have "a reasonable expectation of privacy 
from drug agents with inquisitive nostrils." 
United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398 
(9th Cir.1974). 
Accordingly, the only remaining question at 
issue in this case is whether a law 
enforcement officer, who is lawfully present 
at the front door of a private residence, may 
employ a dog sniff at that front door. Based 
upon binding United States Supreme Court 
precedent, the answer is quite clearly yes. 
The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that "a Fourth Amendment search 
does not occur-even when the explicitly 
protected location of a hOllse is concerned-
unless 'the individual manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search,' and 
'society [is] willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable. '" Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
Additionally, and of great importance here, 
the United States Supreme Court has held 
that a dog sniff does not constitute a search 
within the meanmg of the Fourth 
Amendment because it only reveals 
contraband and there is no legitimate 
privacy interest in contraband that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable. 
First, in Place, 462 U.S. at 707, the United 
States Supreme Court stated the following 
regarding the unique and very limited nature 
of a dog sniff when holding that a dog sniff 
of a passenger's luggage in an airport was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment: 
We have affirmed that a person 
possesses a privacy interest in the 
contents of personal luggage that is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained 
narcotics detection dog, however, 
does not require opening the 
luggage. It does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden from public 
view, as does, for example, an 
officer's rummaging through the 
contents of the luggage. Thus, the 
manner in which information is 
obtained through this investigative 
technique is much less intrusive than 
a typical search. Moreover, the sniff 
discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband 
item. Thus, despite the fact that the 
sniff tells the authorities something 
about the contents of the luggage, the 
information obtained is limited. This 
limited disclosure also ensures that 
the owner of the property is not 
subjected to the embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed m less 
discriminate and more intrusive 
investigative methods. 
In these respects, the canine sniff IS sui 
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generis. We are aware of no other 
investigative procedure that is so limited 
both in the manner in which the information 
is obtained and in the content of the 
information revealed by the procedure. 
Therefore, we conclude that the particular 
course of investigation that the agents 
intended to pursue here--exposure of 
respondent's luggage, which was located in 
a public place, to a trained canine-did not 
constitute a "search" within the meaning of 
the FOUlih Amendment. 
Then, the United States Supreme Court 
further explained its decision in Place when 
holding in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, that a 
chemical test of a package did not constitute 
a search because "governmental conduct 
that can reveal whether a substance is 
cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, 
compromises no legitimate privacy interest." 
The Court stated that this holding was 
"dictated" by Place because, "as in Place, 
the likelihood that official conduct of the 
kind disclosed by the record will actually 
compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy seems much too remote to 
characterize the testing as a search subject to 
the Fourth Amendment." Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. at 124. The COUli explained that "the 
reaSon [the dog sniff in Place] did not 
intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest 
was that the governmental conduct could 
reveal nothing about noncontraband items." 
Thereafter, in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40, the 
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
Place when briefly discussing why a dog 
sniff of the exterior of a car stopped at a 
checkpoint did not constitute a search: 
It is well established that a vehicle 
stop at a highway checkpoint 
effectuates a seizure within the 
meaning of the FOUlih Amendment. 
The fact that officers walk a 
narcotics-detection dog around the 
exterior of each car at the 
Indianapolis checkpoints does not 
transform the seizure into a search. 
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of 
an automobile does not require entry 
into the car and is not designed to 
disclose any information other than 
the presence or absence of narcotics. 
Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by 
a dog that simply walles around a car 
is "much less intrusive than a typical 
search." 
To summarize, in Place, Jacobsen, Edmond, 
the United States Supreme Court held that 
dog sniffs are not searches within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 
they only detect contraband and there is no 
legitimate privacy interest in contraband that 
society recognizes as reasonable. A vast 
majority of federal and state courts have 
interpreted the United States Supreme 
Court's decisions as holding that dog sniffs 
are not searches under the FOUlih 
Amendment, even in the context of private 
residences. 
In this case, Franky the dog was lawfully 
present at Jardines' front door when he 
alerted to the presence of marijuana. And 
because, under the binding United States 
Supreme Court precedent described above, a 
dog sniff only reveals contraband in which 
there is no legitimate privacy interest, 
Franky's sniff cannot be considered a search 
violating the Fourth Amendment. 
The majority concludes that the United 
States Supreme Court's precedent regarding 
dog sniffs does not apply here because those 
dog sniff cases did not involve dog sniffs of 
a home. See majority op. at 44. However, 
the United States Supreme Court did not 
limit its reasoning regarding dogs sniffs to 
locations or objects unrelated to the home. 
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There is no language in Place, Jacobsen, or 
Edmond that indicates the reasoning that dog 
sniffs are not searches would change if the 
cases involved private residences. Therefore, 
the very limited and unique type of intrusion 
involved in a dog sniff is the dispositive 
distinction under United States Supreme 
Court precedent, not whether the object 
sniffed is luggage, an automobile, or a 
home. Accordingly, the majority's holding 
based upon the object sniffed is contrary to 
the United States Supreme Comi's 
precedent. 
In addition, the majority distinguishes the 
binding precedent regarding dog sniffs 
based upon what it terms "public 
opprobrium, humiliation and 
embarrassment." Majority op. at 36, 45, 48, 
49-50. By focusing upon the multiple 
officers and the supposed time involved in 
surveillance and the execution of the search 
warrant, the majority concludes that the sniff 
here was more intensive and involved a 
higher level of embarrassment than the 
sniffs involved in Place and Edmond. See 
majority op. at 46--47, 48--49. However, 
Place and Edmond all involved law 
enforcement activity by multiple officers. 
And although the majority states that the law 
enforcement activity in this case "lasted for 
hours," majority op. at 36, 48, there is no 
evidence in the record to suppOli that 
supposition. To the contrary, when asked 
during the suppression hearing how long he 
and the dog "remain[ ed] on the scene that 
day," Detective Bartlet responded, "That 
was a day we were doing multiple 
operations and I had probably two other 
people waiting for the dog. So I couldn't 
have been there much more than five or ten 
minutes, just enough to grab the information 
on the flash drive, hand it over and leave." 
The other specific testimony regarding time 
in the record is Detective Pedraja's 
testimony during the suppression hearing 
explaining that he conducted surveillance 
for fifteen minutes before approaching the 
residence with Detective Bartlet and the dog 
and that it was "approximately 15 to 20 
minutes from the time that [he] went to the 
front door, was standing at the threshold, 
went to the front door and then came back." 
Fmihermore, as explained above, there are 
no allegations here that the multiple officers 
near lardines' residence violated the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of the level of 
"public opprobrium, humiliation, and 
embarrassment" that the presence of these 
officers may have caused lardines. 
Therefore, distinguishing this case from the 
United States Supreme Comi's dog sniff 
cases based upon the level of embarrassment 
the majority presumes to be present here is 
improper. 
Finally, it is critical to note that the 
majority's (and the special concurrence's) 
assumption that lardines had a reasonable 
expectation that the smell of marijuana 
coming from his residence would remain 
private IS contrary to the explicit 
pronouncements in Jacobsen that the 
possessor of contraband has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in that contraband. 
Indeed, the fact that one has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in contraband is 
precisely why a dog sniff is not a search 
under the United States Supreme Comi's 
precedent interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment. Because the dog sniff is only 
capable of detecting contraband, it is only 
capable of detecting that which is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As held by United States Supreme Court, a 
dog sniff is not a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment because it only 
reveals contraband and there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in contraband that 
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society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 
Given this binding precedent, Franky's sniff, 
while lawfully present at Jardines' front 
door, cannot be considered a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I would 
approve the Third District's decision in 
lardines and disapprove the Fourth 
District's contrary decision in Rabb. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
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"Does the War on Drugs Affect 
Your Privacy Rights?" 
HlIffington Post 
May 22,2012 
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer 
Do the police need a warrant to bring a 
drug-sniffing dog to your front door? The 
U.S. Supreme Court will soon answer that 
question. The case, Florida v. Jardines, may 
even prompt the Court to reconsider its 
previous Fourth Amendment dog sniff cases, 
United States v. Place and I1linois v. 
Caballes. These two decisions had held that 
police don't need a warrant for a dog to sniff 
your luggage in an airport, or your car by the 
side of the road, finding that the sniffs are 
not "searches" under the Fourth 
Amendment. The logic is straightforward: 
since a sniff "discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband item," a 
search after a dog's alert cannot offend 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Of 
course, the logical flaw is equally obvious: 
police dogs often alert when drugs are not 
present, resulting III unnecessary 
suspicionless searches. 
But do these cases track our intuitions about 
privacy? I recently conducted qualitative 
research based on the facts of Florida v. 
Jardines. The complete results appear in a 
new Stanford Law Review Online essay. I 
asked 187 law students whether contraband-
detecting dog sniffs should be considered an 
invasion of privacy under a variety of false 
alert rates. Not surprisingly, the dogs' 
accuracy rates mattered significantly. Fewer 
than half believed that a perfectly accurate 
dog's sniff of a car constituted an invasion 
of privacy that should require a warrant or 
some reasonable suspicion. By comparison, 
two-thirds believed the sniff by the dog with 
a 10 percent false alert error rate needed a 
warrant. 
But accuracy was not the only important 
factor; in fact, it wasn't even the most 
important factor. Unbeknownst to the 
students, the surveys randomly varied the 
type of contraband the dogs were trained to 
detect. Roughly one-third of the students 
responded to a hypothetical scenario 
involving a drug-sniffing dog, one-third 
responded to a bomb-sniffing dog, and one-
third responded to a human cadaver-sniffing 
dog. Students' instincts about privacy were 
very sensitive to the type of criminal 
investigation. Those assigned to react to the 
drug-sniffing dog were much less tolerant of 
police practices. Fifty-six percent of 
respondents believed even the mythical 
perfectly accurate drug sniff constituted a 
FOUlih Amendment search, while the 
corresponding rates for cadavers and bombs 
were 30 percent and 36 percent, 
respectively. The results probably reflect a 
shared skepticism about the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the "war on drugs." If the 
police use a dog to see if you're smoking 
marijuana at home, students think they 
should get a warrant -- but not if they're 
checking for dead bodies, or pipe bombs. 
At present, courts do not consider the type 
of criminal investigation when deciding 
whether police conduct constitutes a search, 
and as a practical matter the distinction is 
futile. The contraband-sniffing dog is just a 
first-generation information-gathering tool. 
In time, a single instrument (possibly a 
drone) will detect drugs and bombs. Ifpolice 
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conduct is sufficiently intrusive, it should 
not evade designation as a search simply 
because it is employed to achieve more 
wOlihwhile criminal enforcement goals. 
Conversely, unobtrusive investigatory 
practices should not be dismissed too 
quickly. Our implicit reaction to drug 
enforcement policies may prompt us to 
welcome a reversal of the previous dog sniff 
cases, but we may be overlooking the value 
of contraband-detecting technologies. 
Traditional suspicion-based policing is 
dependent on the discretion of police 
officers, which is prone to error and bias. 
Suspicionless screens, if they are used 
properly, redistribute the burdens of criminal 
investigation and punishment more 
equitably across the population. Our crime 
control policies are more likely to be 
carefully designed when they will apply to 
all of us. Police techniques that detect 
contraband can simultaneously improve 
crime detection and reduce law enforcement 
discretion (and, hence, potential abuse). 
The Supreme Court should use the Jardines 
case to reconfigure Fourth Amendment 
analysis to accommodate both the old model 
of individualized suspicion and new models 
designed to decrease discretion. To be 
legitimate, these "suspicionless non-
searches" should meet three criteria. The 
tool must have low error, be applied 
uniformly, and have negligible interference 
(that is, the tool itself should not cause 
adverse effects.) The dog sniff in Jm-dines 
fails all three of these elements, and there is 
little reason to believe dogs will ever 
produce a sufficiently low rate of error. But 
other processes and technologies have the 
potential to be what dogs never were-
accurate and fair. With luck, the Court will 
recognize a Fourth Amendment search in 
Jardines without creating a rule that 
reflexively obstructs the use of new 
technologies. 
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"Florida Says Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Front of Private 
Homes Do Not Invade Privacy" 
Gant Daily 
December 30, 2011 
Torn Ramstacl( 
The Supreme Court is being asked to decide 
whether a drug-sniffing dog that detects 
marijuana through the door of a house IS 
violating the privacy of the homeowner. 
Miami police say a dog sniffing the air 
outside a house doesn't trample anyone's 
privacy. It's a matter of discretion for police. 
The homeowner, 10elis 1ardines, said the 
sniffing was a "search" that first requires 
probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed on the site. Otherwise, the police 
violate the homeowner's Fourth Amendment 
rights of privacy. 
Jardines was charged with felony marijuana 
offenses but appealed. 
The Fourth Amendment says that "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause." 
The case began Nov. 3, 2006, when Miami-
Dade police received a Crime Stoppers tip 
that 1ardines' horne was being used to grow 
manJuana. 
Police went to the house on Dec. 6, 2006, 
with a drug detection dog named Franky. 
They observed the house for 15 minutes but 
saw no activity inside. They then stepped 
onto the porch with the dog and stopped at 
the front door. 
The dog handler said Franky indicated a 
"positive alert" for the odor of drugs. 
A detective noticed the air conditioning unit 
was running without stopping, which he said 
often happens in houses where marijuana is 
grown hydroponically under high intensity 
lights that create heat. 
The detective then applied for a search 
warrant, which a local judge granted. Police 
raided the horne and found marijuana. They 
arrested 1m'dines as he fled. 
Jardines's defense relied on a ruling in a 
2004 federal case in which a judge said a 
police dog's sniffing near a house was the 
same as searching the horne. 
For private homes, "a firm line remains at its 
entrance blocking the noses of dogs from 
sniffing government's way into the intimate 
details of an individual's life," the federal 
court ruling said. 
A trial comi agreed and threw out the 
evidence against 1ardines. 
Prosecutors appealed to Florida's 3rd 
District Court of Appeal in Miami, which 
reinstated the case against 1ardines. 
No warrant is needed for a dog to sniff 
around a house, the state appeals court said. 
The court's ruling against 1m'dines relied on 
a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
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said police dogs are trained to search only 
for illegal items, such as drugs. No one has a 
privacy right in illegal drugs, which means a 
dog sniff could not violate anyone's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Unlike wiretaps and surveillance cameras 
that capture all conversations and images on 
a telephone or a place being monitored, dogs 
target their sniffs only at illegal items, the 
Supreme Court said. 
However, the Florida Supreme Court sided 
with the homeowner, saying a dog sniff of a 
house without a warrant is "an unreasonable 
government intrusion into the sanctity of the 
home." 
In the state's appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Attorney General Pam Bondi's petition says 
"Florida courts are now alone in refusing to 
follow" rules of law that would allow drug-
sniffing dogs to be used without warrants 
outside private homes. 
Without using the dogs, the state might not 
be able to get the evidence needed for a 
search warrant, thereby impairing the ability 
of police to enforce drug laws, the petition 
says. 
In addition, dogs are low-tech aids to police 
that do not represent the same degree of 
intrusion as sophisticated electronic 
eavesdropping. 
"Chocolate Labrador retrievers are not 
sophisticated systems," the attorney 
general's petition to the Supreme Court 
says. "Rather, they are common household 
pets that possess a naturally strong sense of 
smell; Nor was there a 'vigorous search 
effort' at the front door; all Franky really did 
was breathe." 
The Supreme COUli could decide as soon as 
next week whether to hear the case of 
Florida. 
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"Florida High Court Rules on 
Drug Dog Sniff Tests" 
The Ledger 
April 14,2011 
The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that 
police must get a warrant before they can do 
a "sniff test" by a drug-detection dog at the 
front door of a home. 
The court released its 5-2 opinion Thursday. 
Police went to a Miami-Dade home in 2006 
with a drug-sniffing dog on a tip, later 
arresting the resident and seizing marijuana. 
The court's majority said police should have 
gotten a warrant first because a drug dog's 
sniffing outside at a private residence 
constitutes a search. 
But dissenters said there's no expectation of 
privacy regarding illegal substances in one's 
home. 
Attorney General Pam Bondi says the ruling 
hinders law enforcement and plans to appeal 
it to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The case is SC08-21 0 1, Joelis Jardines v. 
State of Florida. 
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"The Dog-Sniffing Cases: Made Simple" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 26, 2012 
Lyle Denniston 
Police forces across the country have found 
that dogs, which have a highly developed 
sense of smell, can be trained to detect 
specific odors, such as scents from a human 
body, or the odors given off by illegal drugs. 
This makes police dogs highly valued 
partners to police as they search for missing 
persons, or for illegal narcotics. When a 
trained dog's capacity to detect a certain 
odor has been formally certified by an 
expert, the evidence that police gain from 
dog searches frequently is permitted in 
criminal cases in comt. But the Supreme 
Court several times has had to rule on 
whether a search by a trained police dog is 
the kind of inspection that must be done 
so that it does not violate the constitutional 
right to privacy of the individual targeted. 
The Court will give further constitutional 
guidance in two new cases, both originating 
in Florida. 
The Fourth Amendment is one of the 
Constitution's strongest guarantees of 
personal privacy, especially for the privacy 
of the home. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that the protection given by 
the Amendment is intended to protect 
people, rather than physical space. But its 
protection does extend beyond the 
individual's own body, to places and things 
which the owner and society in general 
would recognize as intended to be free from 
government intrusion. Thus, the protection 
can apply to houses, documents, and 
personal belongings. Searches by police or 
other government agents, however, are 
generally barred only if they are 
"unreasonable." That is a sufficiently 
flexible word that courts have traditionally 
had to fill in meaning on how to apply it in 
specific situations. The Amendment also 
provides that, as a general rule, police 
cannot carry out a search unless they have 
the permission of a judge, through a 
"warrant." Police can obtain a warrant to 
carry out a search only if they have a fairly 
strong reason to believe that the search will 
turn up evidence of crime. Police do not 
have to be absolutely celtain that the search 
will lead to evidence, but rather that 
prospect must be "probable." In some 
situations, a warrant is not needed, but 
police still need to show that a search 
"probably" will turn up criminal evidence. 
But, before FOUlth Amendment protection 
comes into play, police activity must 
actually be found to be a "search" in a legal 
sense. For example, if one puts the family 
trash out on the curb, police can inspect it 
without getting a warrant because the family 
has given up any expectation that the 
contents of the trash bags are private. But, if 
the trash is still in the can inside the house, 
perhaps in the kitchen, police could search it 
only if they got a warrant allowing them to 
do so; that would be a search in a place that 
the homeowner considers to be private, and 
so does society in general. For another 
example, if one keeps drugs in the glove 
compartment of a car or truck, and police 
pull over that vehicle for a traffic violation, 
police are not allowed to search the glove 
compartment unless they have some reason 
to think that the search will turn up evidence 
related to the reason the vehicle was 
stopped. But if the individual, on getting out 
of the vehicle, drops a package of drugs on 
the ground, police can gather that up and use 
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it as evidence, because they were not 
searching for it when it just turned up. 
It is clear, then, that the factual situation can 
make a difference constitutionally. And that 
is why the Supreme Court has had to return 
periodically to define the situations in which 
the police may use a drug-sniffing dog, 
without violating someone's right to privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment. That issue 
arises, of course, because a well-trained 
drug-sniffing dog, by giving an "alert" to its 
police handler when the animal smells a 
specific drug, may actually lead the police to 
the discovery of evidence of a crime. If the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply at all, 
police may hand over that evidence to a 
prosecutor who pursues criminal charges. 
But if the Fourth Amendment might apply, 
the evidence might be valid or it might not 
be, depending upon the factual situation. 
Police and prosecutors have generally 
argued in court cases that the use of a drug-
sniffing dog is not a "search" at all, because 
the only thing that a dog's "aleti" identifies 
is something that is illegal anyway, and no 
one has any privacy right in illegal items or 
substances. The Supreme Court has 
sometimes embraced that argument. 
For example, the COUli has ruled that it is 
not a "search" under the FOUlih Amendment 
if police use a dog to sniff the exterior of 
luggage that police have temporarily seized 
in an airport terminal, believing that it is 
likely to contain something illegal. It also 
has allowed police to check the outside of a 
vehicle that police have legitimately stopped 
at a highway checkpoint set up to search for 
illegal drugs, or to check the outside of a 
vehicle that police have legally stopped for a 
suspected traffic violation. In each of those 
situations, the impact on privacy was 
considered to be very slight, because the 
intrusion was minimal, so the use of the dog 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Suppose, though, that police use a dog to 
check for narcotics on the exterior of a home 
that they suspect is being used for drug 
trafficking. Does the fact that the site of the 
search is a private home make a 
constitutional difference? That is one of the 
new factual situations that the Supreme 
Court is now preparing to confront. In the 
case of Florida v. Jardines, Florida's state 
supreme court ruled that the U.S. Supreme 
Comi's past rulings on the use of drug-
sniffing dogs did not apply at all when a dog 
was used at a home, even if the dog only 
sniffed exterior surfaces of a house. 
Nowhere is the right of privacy stronger 
than in a private home, the state court said. 
That case originated when police in Miami 
got a tip from a "crime stopper" source that 
the home of 10elis lardines was being used 
to grow marijuana. Police went to the home, 
based on that tip alone, and used a trained 
detection dog named Franky to check out 
the front porch of the house. After circling 
for a few minutes, Franky sat down, near the 
front door. That indicated to his police 
handler that the dog had detected an odor of 
marijuana coming from under the front door. 
At that point, the officers obtained a search 
warrant, which the officers then carried out, 
finding a marijuana-growing operation 
inside the house. lardines was charged with 
growing illegal marijuana plants, but his 
lawyer contended that the search was 
unconstitutional because it intruded on the 
privacy of the home. 
The state's highest court relied primarily 
upon a 2001 Supreme Court decision, in the 
case of Kyllo v. United States, a ruling that it 
is unconstitutional for police to use a heat-
sensing device aimed at the outside walls of 
a house, to check to see if marijuana was 
being grown inside with the use of high-
intensity lamps. When the government uses 
a device that the general public does not 
employ, and the police use it to explore the 
370 
details of a home, the state court said, that is 
a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. A 
trained dog's sniff test fits into that category, 
it concluded, adding that such a test reveals 
not only the presence of something illegal, 
but it also is capable-when carried out in 
public view-of exposing the homeowner to 
public humiliation and embarrassment, and 
further is capable of being used in a 
discriminatory way. Before police may 
conduct such a sniff test, it ruled, they must 
be able to show in court-after the fact-
that they had more than mere suspicion that 
a crime was being committed in the crime; 
they had to have information indicating that 
it was "probable" that there was such 
criminal wrongdoing taking place in the 
home. The bottom line of the ruling: the use 
of Franky at the Jardines home was 
"unreasonable," so the marijuana evidence 
could not be used against him. 
That ruling is being challenged by state 
officials of Florida in their appeal to the 
Supreme Court. They have the support of 
the federal government for their challenge. 
Their basic claim is that a sniff test by a 
drug is not a search at all, at a home or 
elsewhere. 
In the other Florida case that the Justices 
will be reviewing (Florida v. Harris), state 
officials have persuaded the Court to return 
to the issue of a dog sniff test on a car or 
truck, not a home. But this time, the sniff 
test was done on the inside of a private 
truck. The Florida Supreme Court, finding 
that the U.S. Supreme Court's prior rulings 
involving sniff tests and vehicles only 
involved checking the exterior of a vehicle, 
decided that the Fourth Amendment 
provided greater protection when the dog's 
"aleli" led police to search the interior of a 
vehicle. But the decision also is important 
because the state court spelled out the 
information that police must have in order to 
convince a court that a drug-sniffing dog can 
be trusted to make a reliable "alert" 
indicating that illegal drugs were present. 
A Liberty County sheriffs deputy with a 
drug-detecting dog named Aldo, who had 
been trained to detect the illegal drug 
methamphetamine, was on patrol in 
Blountstown, Florida. The deputy pulled 
over a truck driven by Clayton Harris 
because the license plate on the vehicle had 
expired. The officer noticed that Harris was 
shaking badly, and was breathing rapidly-
telltale signs, for the officer, that Harris 
might be on drugs. The officer asked for 
permission to search the truck, but Harris 
refused. The dog then "alelied" to a drug on 
the door handle of the driver's side of the 
truck. With that "alert" as legal justification, 
the officer searched the interior of the 
truck's cab, and found ingredients for 
making methamphetamine. 
Harris was charged with possessing 
materials for making the illegal drug, and his 
defense lawyer challenged the use of the 
evidence found in the truck's cab, arguing 
that the search of the truck's interior 
violated the FOUlih Amendment because the 
deputy had no legal basis for conducting 
such a search. The Florida Supreme COUli 
agreed, concluding that Aldo's "alert" to a 
substance on the truck door handle was not 
sufficient to justify searching the cab. A 
police dog's "alert," the state cOUli said, is 
not enough by itself to satisfy a court that 
the dog is properly trained and certified for 
the detection of a specific illegal drug. A 
court can accept an "alert" as a basis for a 
search only if the evidence shows how the 
particular dog was trained, what was done to 
satisfy an expert that the dog was adequately 
trained, how the dog had actually performed 
in "alerting" to drugs in other situations, and 
how well trained and how experienced was 
the dog's police handler. 
The state court remarked that it appeared 
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that, in dog-sniffing drug cases, "the courts 
often accept the mythic dog with an almost 
superstitious faith. The myth so completely 
has dominated the judicial psyche in these 
cases that the courts either assume the 
reliability of the sniff or address the question 
cursorily; the dog is the clear and consistent 
winner." 
Finding in the Harris case that there was not 
enough proof that Aldo was a reliable drug 
detector, the state court overturned Clayton 
Harris's no-contest plea to the criminal 
charge, because the evidence taken out of 
the truck cab should not have been allowed 
in court. 
State officials, with the support of the 
federal government, have asked the Supreme 
Court to rule that the fact that a trained and 
certified dog does make an "alert" should be 
enough to justify a police officer's further 
search of a vehicle for illegal drugs. 
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Florida v. Harris 
11-817 
Ruling Below: Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011), as revised on denial ofreh'g (Sept. 22, 
2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 986836 (U.S. 2012). 
During a traffic stop in 2006, Clayton Harris's truck was searched by the Liberty County Sheriff 
after police dog Aldo alerted the police to drugs in HalTis's vehicle. The police found 
pseudoephedrine pills, matches, and muriatic acid, all materials used to make methamphetamine 
("meth"). Two months later, Harris was stopped for another traffic infraction and was searched 
after another alert by Aldo, but no illegal drugs were found during this second search. Harris was 
charged with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to use it to manufacture 
methamphetamine, violating Florida Statutes § 893.149(1)(a) (2006). Harris moved to suppress 
the seized evidence, including the pseudoephedrine, arguing that it was found pursuant to an 
illegal search of his truck. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that there was 
probable cause to search Harris's truck, and admitted the physical evidence seized. Harris then 
entered a plea of no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion, and was 
sentenced to two years in jail and five years of probation. The First District affirmed, again 
finding probable cause for the searches. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court 
should have granted Harris's motion to suppress and remanded the case. The Supreme COUli of 
Florida applied a totality of the circumstances approach, requiring the State present evidence and 
explanation of training and celiification, field performance records, and evidence concerning the 
experience and training of the officer handling the dog. 
Question Presented: Whether an aleli by a well-trained narcotics detection dog certified to 
detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle. 
Clayton HARRIS, Petitioner, 
v. 
ST ATE of Florida, Respondent 
Supreme Court of Florida 
Decided April 21, 2011; Revised on Denial of Rehearing September 22,2011 
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes, and citations omitted.] 
PARIENTE, Judge 
When will a drug-detection dog's alert to the 
exterior of a vehicle provide an officer with 
probable cause to conduct a warrantless 
search of the interior of the vehicle? That is 
the question in this case, and the answer is 
integral to the constitutional right of all 
individuals in this state to be protected from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The issue of when a dog's aleli provides 
probable cause for a search hinges on the 
dog's reliability as a detector of illegal 
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substances within the vehicle. We hold that 
the State may establish probable cause by 
demonstrating that the officer had a 
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be 
reliable based on the totality of the 
circumstances. Because a dog cannot be 
cross-examined like a police officer on the 
scene whose observations often provide the 
basis for probable cause to search a vehicle, 
the State must introduce evidence 
concerning the dog's reliability. In this case, 
we specifically address the question of what 
evidence the State must introduce in order to 
establish the reasonableness of the officer's 
belief-in other words, what evidence must 
be introduced in order for the trial court to 
adequately undertake an objective 
evaluation of the officer's belief in the dog's 
reliability as a predicate for determining 
probable cause. 
The appellate courts addressing the issue in 
this state have differed on what evidence the 
State must present to meet its burden. The 
decision of the First District Court of Appeal 
in Harris v. State, 989 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1 st 
DCA 2008), expressly and directly conflicts 
with the decisions of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Gibson v. State, 968 
So.2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), and 
Matheson v. State, 870 So.2d 8 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2003). In Harris, the First District 
without elaboration cited State v. Laveroni 
910 So.2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and 
State v. Coleman, 911 So.2d 259 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2005), as authority in suppOli of 
affirming the trial court, which upheld the 
search at issue. The First District also cited 
Gibson, which followed Matheson, as 
contradictory authority. 
The reliability of a dog as a detector of 
illegal substances is subject to a totality of 
the circumstances analysis. Thus, the trial 
court must be presented with the evidence 
necessary to make an adequate 
determination as to the dog's reliability. For 
the reasons explained below, we hold that 
evidence that the dog has been trained and 
celiified to detect narcotics, standing alone, 
is not sufficient to establish the dog's 
reliability for purposes of determining 
probable cause-especially since training 
and celiification in this state are not 
standardized and thus each training and 
certification program may differ with no 
meaningful way to assess them. 
Accordingly, we conclude that to meet its 
burden of establishing that the officer had a 
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be 
reliable in order to establish probable cause, 
the State must present the training and 
certification records, an explanation of the 
meaning of the particular training and 
celiification of that dog, field performance 
records, and evidence concerning the 
experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog, as well as any other 
objective evidence known to the officer 
about the dog's reliability in being able to 
detect the presence of illegal substances 
within the vehicle. To adopt the contrary 
view that the burden is on the defendant to 
present evidence of the factors other than 
certification and training in order to 
demonstrate that the dog is unreliable would 
be contrary to the well-established 
proposition that the burden is on the State to 
establish probable cause for a warrantless 
search. In addition, since all of the records 
and evidence are in the possession of the 
State, to shift the burden to the defendant to 
produce evidence of the dog's unreliability 
is unwarranted and unduly burdensome. 
Accordingly, we quash Harris and 
disapprove Coleman and Laveroni. We 
approve Gibson and Matheson to the extent 
they are consistent with this opinion. 
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FACTS 
In July 2006, the State charged Clayton 
Harris with possession of the listed chemical 
pseudoephedrine with intent to use it to 
manufacture methamphetamine, more 
commonly known as meth, in violation of 
section 893.149(l)(a), Florida Statutes 
(2006). Harris subsequently moved to 
suppress seized evidence, including the 
pseudoephedrine, arguing that it was found 
pursuant to an illegal search of his truck. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the 
evidence established that on June 24, 2006, 
Liberty County Sheriffs Canine Officer 
William Wheetley and his drug-detection 
dog, Aldo, were on patrol. Officer Wheetley 
conducted a traffic stop of Harris's truck 
after confirming that Harris's tag was 
expired. Upon approaching the truck, 
Officer Wheetley noticed that Harris was 
shaking, breathing rapidly, and could not sit 
still. Officer Wheetley also noticed an open 
beer can in the cup holder. When Officer 
Wheetley asked for consent to search the 
truck, Harris refused. Officer Wheetley then 
deployed Aldo. Upon conducting a "free air 
sniff' of the exterior of the truck, Aldo 
alerted to the door handle of the driver's 
side. 
Underneath the driver's seat, Officer 
Wheetley discovered over 200 
pseudoephedrine pills in a plastic bag 
wrapped in a shirt. On the passenger's side, 
Officer Wheetley discovered eight boxes of 
matches containing a total of 8000 matches. 
Officer Wheetley then placed Harris under 
arrest. A subsequent search of a toolbox on 
the passenger side revealed muriatic acid. 
Officer Wheetley testified that these 
chemicals are precursors of 
methamphetamine. After being read his 
Miranda rights, Harris stated that he had 
been cooking meth for about one year and 
most recently cooked it at his home in 
Blountstown two weeks prior to the stop. 
Harris also admitted to being addicted to 
meth and needing it at least every few days. 
As of the day that Officer Wheetley 
searched Harris's truck, Officer Wheetley 
had been a law enforcement officer for three 
years and had been a canine handler since 
2004. In January 2004, Aldo completed a 
120-hour drug detection training course at 
the Apopka Police Department with his 
handler at the time, Deputy Sherriff William 
Morris. In February 2004, Aldo was 
certified with Morris as a drug-detection dog 
by Drug Beat K-9 Certifications. Aldo is 
trained and certified to detect cannabis, 
cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and 
methamphetamine. Aldo is not trained to 
detect alcohol or pseudoephedrine. Although 
Officer Wheetley testified that 
pseudoephedrine is a precursor of meth, 
there was no testimony on whether a dog 
trained to detect and alert to meth would 
also detect and aleli to pseudoephedrine. 
In July 2005, Aldo and Officer Wheetley 
became partners. In February 2006, they 
completed a forty-hour training seminar 
with the Dothan Police Department. Officer 
Wheetley testified that he and Aldo 
complete this seminar annually. 
Additionally, Officer Wheetley trains Aldo 
four hours per week in detecting drugs in 
vehicles, buildings, and warehouses. For 
example, Officer Wheetley may take Aldo 
to a wrecker yard and plant drugs in six to 
eight out of ten vehicles. Officer Wheetley 
then takes Aldo and performs a "W pattern, 
up, down, up, down." 
Aldo must alert to the vehicles with drugs, 
and he is rewarded for an accurate aleli. 
Officer Wheetley described Aldo's success 
rate during training as "really good." Aldo's 
training records, which Officer Wheetley 
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began keeping in November 2005, were 
introduced in evidence. These records reveal 
that on a performance level of either 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory, Aldo 
performed satisfactory 100% of the time. 
However, Officer Wheetley did not explain 
whether a satisfactory performance includes 
any alerts to vehicles where drugs were not 
placed. 
Officer Wheetley also testified that in 
Florida a single-purpose dog, such as one 
trained only to detect drugs, is not required 
by law to carry celiification. These dogs are 
required to show proficiency only in 
locating drugs. By contrast, a dual-purpose 
dog, such as one trained in apprehension and 
drug detection, must carry Florida 
Depmiment of Law Enforcement (FDLE) 
certification. Florida does not have a set 
standard for certification for single-purpose 
drug dogs, such as Aldo. 
With regard to Aldo's performance in the 
field, Officer Wheetley testified that he 
deploys Aldo approximately five times per 
month. Officer Wheetley maintains records 
of Aldo's field performance only when 
Officer Wheetley makes an arrest. Officer 
Wheetley testified that he does not keep 
records of Aldo's alerts in the field when no 
contraband is found; he documents only 
Aldo's successes. These records were 
neither produced prior to the hearing nor 
introduced at the hearing. Thus, it is 
impossible to determine what percentage of 
time Aldo alerted and no contraband was 
found following a warrantless search of the 
vehicle. 
Harris introduced evidence of a specific 
instance of Aldo's field performance to 
support his position that Aldo is unreliable 
involving this same vehicle and same 
defendant. About two months after the June 
24 stop, Officer Wheetley stopped Harris 
again for a traffic infraction. On this stop, 
Officer Wheetley again deployed Aldo, who 
alerted to the same driver's side door handle. 
A subsequent search of the huck revealed 
only an open bottle of liquor and no illegal 
substances. 
Officer Wheetley testified to the issue of 
residual odors. According to Officer 
Wheetley, Aldo can pick up residual odors 
of illegal drugs on an object when, for 
example, someone has the odor on his or her 
hand and touches a door handle. When 
asked how long a residual odor can remain 
on the handle, Officer Wheetley stated that 
he was not qualified to answer that question. 
Regarding the alert in this case, Officer 
Wheetley testified that Aldo presumably 
alerted to residual odor of meth on the door 
handle, indicating that Officer Wheetley did 
not believe that Aldo alerted to any of the 
substances found in the vehicle .... 
[T]he State argued that Officer Wheetley 
had probable cause based on the totality of 
the circumstances, which included the 
expired tag, open container, nervousness, 
and an alert by a trained and certified drug-
detection dog. In challenging the issue of 
probable cause, the defense argued that the 
State failed to establish Aldo's reliability. 
According to the defense, any dog can be 
trained, but what matters most is that the 
dog obtains positive results in the field. The 
defense focused on the fact that on two 
occasions (once on June 24, the stop at 
issue, and once after the stop at issue) Aldo 
alerted to Harris's truck and no drugs were 
found that Aldo was trained to detect. 
In an oral ruling, the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress, found that there was 
probable cause to search Harris's truck, and 
admitted the physical evidence seized. The 
trial court did not make a finding as to the 
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dog's reliability or any other factual 
findings. 
Harris then entered a plea of no contest, 
reserving the right to appeal the denial of the 
motion. He was sentenced to twenty-four 
months' incarceration and five years of 
probation. On appeal, the First District 
affirmed. Harris subsequently petitioned this 
Court for discretionary review, which we 
accepted based on express and direct 
conflict between the First and Second 
Districts. 
THE CONFLICT ISSUE 
The question presented to the First 
District-and now to this Court-concerns 
the evidence that the State must introduce to 
establish that probable cause existed for the 
warrantless search of a vehicle based on a 
drug-detection dog's alert to the vehicle. To 
clarify the conflict, we will outline the 
approaches adopted by the First, Second, 
Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, 
which have all addressed this issue. 
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts agree 
that the State can establish probable cause to 
search a vehicle by demonstrating that a dog 
is properly trained and certified to detect 
illegal drugs. See Harris, 989 So.2d at 1215; 
Laveroni, 910 So.2d at 336; Coleman, 911 
So.2d at 261. None of the comis address 
what would constitute "proper training and 
certification," nor do they address the fact 
that there is no statewide certification for 
single-purpose drug-detection dogs. These 
districts do not consider field performance 
records to be irrelevant; their position is that 
if the defendant wishes to challenge the 
reliability of the dog, it is the defendant's 
burden to introduce field performance 
records of the dog or other evidence, such as 
expert testimony .... 
The Second District has reached the 
opposite conclusion on similar facts. 
According to the Second District III 
Matheson, "the fact that a dog has been 
trained and certified, standing alone, is 
insufficient to give officers probable cause 
to search based on the dog's alert." The 
Second District reasoned that "[a]n officer 
who knows only that his dog is trained and 
certified, and who has no other information, 
at most can only suspect that a search based 
on the dog's alert will yield contraband. Of 
course, mere suspicion cannot justify a 
search." ld. at 13. Thus, the Second District 
concluded that "the most telling indicator of 
what the dog's behavior means is the dog's 
past performance in the field." Jd. at 15. 
The Second District also discussed the issue 
of residual odors: 
[I]n this case Razor's trainer 
acknowledged the tendency of 
narcotics detection dogs to aleli on 
the residual odors of drugs that are 
no longer present. 
This underscores one of three central 
reasons why the fact that a dog has 
been trained, standing alone, is not 
enough to give an officer probable 
cause to search based on the dog's 
alert. Razor's trainer acknowledged 
that a trained dog, doing what he has 
been conditioned to do, imparts to 
the officer merely that he detects the 
odor of contraband. To be sure, as 
the trainer maintained, this may not 
be a false aleli when assessing the 
success of the dog's conditioning. 
But for Fourth Amendment purposes 
it is neither false nor positive. The 
presence of a drug's odor at an 
intensity detectable by the dog, but 
not by the officer, does not mean that 
the drug itself is present. 
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Id. at 13. The Second District then 
enunciated concerns with relying solely on 
evidence that the dog was trained or 
"conditioned" to respond in patiicular ways 
to patiicular stimuli ..... 
In this regard, the Second District high-
lighted that "conditioning and certification 
programs vary widely in their methods, 
elements, and tolerances of failure." Id. at 
14 .... In rejecting the proposition that 
evidence of training and certification alone 
is sufficient to give probable cause to search 
based on the dog's alert, the Second District 
held that multiple factors should be 
considered, including the exact training 
received, the criteria for selecting the dogs 
in the program, the standards the dog was 
required to meet to successfully complete 
the training program, and the "track record" 
of the dog in the field, with an emphasis on 
the number of mistakes the dog has made. 
See id. at 14-15). 
In Gibson, 968 So.2d at 631, the Second 
District held that the State had failed to 
establish that the drug-detection dog's alert 
provided probable cause for the search .... 
The Second District concluded that, under 
Matheson, the officer's testimony was 
inadequate to establish the dog's reliability. 
ld. 
As explained in our analysis below, we 
agree with the Second District's bottom-line 
conclusion that the State cannot establish 
probable cause by introducing evidence only 
that the dog was trained and celiified. We 
disapprove of the conclusions of the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Districts that the State can 
meet its burden of establishing probable 
cause by presenting evidence that the dog is 
trained and celiified to detect illegal drugs 
and then shifting the burden to the defendant 
to counter this evidence. 
ANALYSIS 
As previously stated, the question presented 
concerns the showing that the State must 
make to establish probable cause for a 
warrantless search of a vehicle based on a 
drug-detection dog's aleli to the vehicle. 
This issue involves a trial court's 
determination of the legal issue of probable 
cause, which we review de novo. Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 
However, we defer to a trial court's findings 
of historical fact as long as they are 
supported by competent, substantial 
evidence. See Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 
598, 608 (Fla. 2001). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "[ t ]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also art. I, § 12, 
Fla. Const. "[S]earches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
One such exception to the warrant 
requirement is the "automobile exception," 
first established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a warrantless 
search of a vehicle based upon probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle contains 
contraband is not unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
149. The automobile exception of not 
requiring a warrant is based on the inherent 
mobility of vehicles, as well as the reduced 
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expectation of pnvacy in a vehicle. 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 
(1996). Although an individual has a 
"reduced expectation of privacy in an 
automobile, owing to its pervasive 
regulation," id, he or she "does not 
surrender all the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment by entering an automobile," 
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) .... 
The cases make clear that probable cause to 
search a vehicle is based on the same facts 
that would justify the issuance of a warrant. 
See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467 .... 
The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that the probable cause standard 
"depends on the totality of the 
circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 
U.S. 366 (2003). "Probable cause exists 
when 'there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. '" United States 
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95, (2006) .... 
Probable cause is a "'practical, nontechnical 
conception' that deals with 'the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act. '" ld at 370. 
This Court, obliged to follow precedent 
from the United States Supreme Court, has 
explained: 
An examination of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence reveals a decidedly 
broad definition of when law 
enforcement officers have the 
authority to engage in a warrantless 
search: Probable cause exists where 
"the facts and circumstances within 
their (the officers') knowledge and 
of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that" an offense has been or is 
being committed. 
State v. Betz, 815 So.2d 627 (Fla. 2002). The 
burden is on the State to demonstrate that 
the police had probable cause to conduct a 
warrantless search. See Doctor v. State, 596 
So.2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1992). 
When it comes to the use of drug-detection 
dogs, the United States Supreme Court has 
explained that "the use of a well-trained 
narcotics-detection dog-one that 'does not 
expose noncontraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden from public view,'-
during a lawful traffic stop, generally does 
not implicate legitimate privacy interests." 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. Caballes and 
Place considered the issue of whether the 
use of a "well-trained" drug-detection dog 
constitutes a search and not the 
circumstances of how the trial court 
determines whether the drug-detection dog 
is well-trained and when the dog's alert will 
constitute probable cause to believe that 
there are illegal substances within the 
vehicle. 
Because the dog cannot be cross-examined 
like a police officer whose observations at 
the scene may provide the basis for probable 
cause, the trial court must be able to assess 
the dog's reliability by evaluating the dog's 
training, certification, and performance, as 
well as the training and experience of the 
dog's handler. Similar to situations where 
probable cause to search is based on the 
information provided by informants, the trial 
court must be able to evaluate the reliability 
of the dog based on a totality of 
circumstances. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-
31. A critical part of the informant's 
reliability is the informant's track record of 
giving accurate information in the past. 
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Like the informant whose information forms 
the basis for probable cause, where the dog's 
alert is the linchpin of the probable cause 
analysis, such as in this case, the reliability 
of the dog to alert to illegal substances 
within the vehicle is crucial to determining 
whether probable cause exists. If a dog is 
not a reliable detector of drugs, the dog's 
alert in a particular case, by itself, does not 
indicate that drugs are probably present in 
the vehicle. In fact, if the dog's ability to 
alert to the presence of illegal substances in 
the vehicle is questionable, the danger is that 
individuals will be subjected to searches of 
their vehicles and their persons without 
probable cause. Conversely, if a dog is a 
reliable detector of drugs, the dog's ale1i in a 
particular case can indicate that drugs are 
probably present in the vehicle. In those 
circumstances, the drug-detection dog's alert 
will indicate to the officer that there is a 
"fair probability that contraband" will be 
found. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Thus, to 
determine whether the officer has a 
reasonable basis for concluding that the 
dog's ale1i indicates a fair probability that 
contraband will be found, the trial cOUli 
must be able to adequately make an 
objective evaluation of the reliability of the 
dog. 
We conclude that when a dog ale1is, the fact 
that the dog has been trained and ce1iified is 
simply not enough to establish probable 
cause to search the interior of the vehicle 
and the person. We first note that there is no 
uniform standard in this state or nationwide 
for an acceptable level of training, testing, or 
certification for drug-detection dogs. In 
contrast to dual-purpose drug-detection 
dogs, which are apparently certified by 
FDLE, no such required certification exists 
in this state for dogs like Aldo, who 1S a 
single-purpose drug-detection dog. 
In the absence of a uniform standard, the 
reliability of the dog cannot be established 
by demonstrating only that a canine is 
trained and certified. "[S]imply 
characterizing a dog as 'trained' and 
'certified' impmis scant information about 
what the dog has been conditioned to do or 
not to do, or how successfully." Matheson, 
870 So.2d at 14. In other words, whether a 
dog has been sufficiently trained and 
certified must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis .... 
One commentator has described the 
"'mythic infallibility' of the dog's nose": 
In cases involving dog sniffing for 
narcotics it is pa1iicularly evident 
that the courts often accept the 
mythic dog with an almost 
superstitious faith. The myth so 
completely has dominated the 
judicial psyche in those cases that the 
courts either assume the reliability of 
the sniff or address the question 
cursorily; the dog is the clear and 
consistent winner. 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose 
Knovv? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog 
Scent Lineup, 42 Hastings L.J. 15, 22, 28 
(1990). Another commentator has noted that 
"not all dogs are well-trained and well-
handled, nor are all dogs temperamentally 
suited to the demands of being a working 
dog. Some dogs are distractible or 
suggestible, and may alert improperly. Many 
factors may lead to an unreliable ale1i." 
Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and 
Probable Calise, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 
4 (2006). 
Second, and related to the first concern, any 
presumption of reliability based only on the 
fact that the dog has been trained and 
ce1iified does not take into account the 
potential for false alerts, the potential for 
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handler error, and the possibility of alerts to 
residual odors. As the Second District aptly 
observed, "[a]n officer who knows only that 
his dog is trained and certified, and who has 
no other information, at most can only 
suspect that a search based on the dog's alert 
will yield contraband. Of course, mere 
SuspICIOn cannot justify a search." 
Matheson, 870 So.2d at 13. 
"A false [alert] is an alert by the dog in the 
absence of the substance it is trained to 
detect." Myers, s1lpra, at 12. False alerts 
may lead to the search of a person who is 
innocent of any wrongdoing. Id. Cases 
demonstrate that the false-alert rate among 
certified detection dogs varies significantly. 
Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, 
C1Irbing the Dog: Extending the Protection 
of the F01lrth Amendment to Police Drug 
Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735 (2007). 
Coupled with the concern for false alelis is 
the potential for handler error and handler 
cuing. "Handler error affects the accuracy of 
a dog. The relationship between a dog and 
its handler is the most impOliant element in 
dog sniffing, providing unlimited 
oppOliunities for the handler to influence the 
dog's behavior." Id. at 762. Therefore, the 
trial court must also focus on the training of 
the handler. "Handlers interpret their dogs' 
signals, and the handler alone makes the 
final decision whether a dog has detected 
narcotics. Practitioners in the field reveal 
that handler error accounts for almost all 
false detections." Robert C. Bird, An 
Examination of the Training and Reliability 
of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. LJ. 
405, 425 (1997). 
A related problem is the possibility of 
handler cuing. "Even the best of dogs, with 
the best-intentioned handler, can respond to 
subconscious cuing from the handler. If the 
handler believes that contraband is present, 
they may unwittingly cue the dog to alert 
regardless of the actual presence or absence 
of any contraband. Finally, some handlers 
may consciously cue their dog to alert to 
ratify a search they already want to 
conduct." Myers, s1lpra, at 5. 
An alert to a residual odor is different from a 
false aleli, although both types of alerts may 
result in subjecting the person and vehicle to 
an invasive search when no contraband is 
actually present. Because of the sensitivity 
(or hypersensitivity) of a dog's nose, a dog 
may alert to a residual odor, which may not 
indicate the presence of drugs in the vehicle 
at the time of the sniff: 
Given the level of sensitivity that 
many dogs possess, it is possible that 
if the person being searched had 
attended a party where other people 
were using drugs, the dog would 
alert because of the residue on 
clothing or fabric. It is possible that 
in a vehicle that had formerly been 
used to transport drugs, the dog 
would alert, despite the fact that 
drugs were no longer present. Or it is 
possible that some sort of residue 
normally associated with drugs was 
present. 
Myers, s1lpra, at 4-5. Therefore, the alert 
may not even mean that drugs were ever 
present in the vehicle or on the person. 
Because of these variables, a necessary part 
of the totality of the circumstances analysis 
in a given case regarding the dog's 
reliability is an evaluation of the evidence 
concerning whether the dog in the past has 
falsely alerted, indicating that the dog is not 
well-trained, or whether the alelis indicate a 
dog who is alerting on a consistent basis to 
residual odors, which do not indicate that 
drugs are present m the vehicle. 
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Accordingly, evidence of the dog's 
performance history in the field-and the 
significance of any incidents where the dog 
alelied without contraband being found-is 
part of a court's evaluation of the dog's 
reliability under a totality of the 
circumstances analysis. In particular, when 
assessing the factors bearing on the dog's 
reliability, it is important to include, as part 
of a complete evaluation, how often the dog 
has alerted in the field without illegal 
contraband having been found. 
The State argues that records of field 
performance are meaningless because dogs 
do not distinguish between residual odors 
and drugs that are present and, thus, alerts in 
the field without contraband having been 
found are merely unverified alelis, not false 
alerts. This assertion, if correct, raises its 
own set of concerns as it relates to a 
probable cause determination of whether the 
dog's alert indicates a fair probability that 
there are drugs presently inside the vehicle. 
In any event, the record in this case does not 
contain any testimony as to whether dogs 
can be trained to distinguish between 
residual odors and drugs and, further, there 
were no field records or testimony presented 
in this case in order to allow for a careful 
examination of the significance of field 
performance. Officer Wheetley was unable 
to testify as to a complete picture of Aldo's 
performance in the field. In future cases, the 
State can explain the significance of the 
percentage of unverified alerts in the field. 
The trial court would then be able to 
evaluate how any inability to distinguish 
between residual odors and drugs that are 
actually present bears on the reliability of 
the alert in establishing probable cause. 
Finally, to adopt the view of the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Districts would be to place 
the burden on the defendant to uncover all 
records and evidence that might challenge a 
presumption of reliability-evidence that is 
exclusively within the control of law 
enforcement authorities and, fmiher, 
evidence that law enforcement agencies may 
choose not to record, such as in this case. 
Placing this burden on the defendant is 
contrary to the well-established proposition 
that the burden is on the State to establish 
probable cause for a warrantless search. See 
Doctor, 596 So.2d at 445. Because the State 
must establish that the officer has a 
reasonable basis for believing that his or her 
dog is reliable in order to prove probable 
cause based on the dog's alert, the State 
carries the burden of presenting the 
necessary records and evidence for the trial 
court to consider in adequately evaluating 
the dog's reliability. 
Some cOUlis have adopted a similar totality 
of the circumstances approach to 
determining a dog's reliability. See, e.g., 
State v. Ng1lyen, 726 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 
2007) .... 
Further, other courts have endorsed the trial 
comi's consideration of multiple factors, 
with emphasis on the number of "false 
alerts" by the dog. For instance, in State v. 
England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn. 2000), 
the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a per 
se rule that probable cause may be 
established through a positive alert by a 
trained narcotics detection dog. The court 
reasoned that the probable cause 
determination should turn on the dog's 
reliability and that the trial court should 
ensure that the dog is reliable by making 
factual findings. Id The court set fOlih the 
following framework for this required 
reliability determination: 
Accordingly, in our view, the trial 
comi, in making the reliability 
determination may consider such 
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factors as: the canine's training and 
the canine's "track record," with 
emphasis on the amount of false 
negatives and false positives the dog 
has furnished. The trial court should 
also consider the officer's training 
and experience with this palticular 
canine.ld. 
Additionally, in United States v. Florez, 871 
F.Supp. 1411 (D.N.M. 1994), the United 
States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico observed that certified dogs have 
falsely alerted and found the fact that a dog 
is certified should not be sufficient to 
establish probable cause. While analogizing 
to an informant's tip, the court set forth the 
following framework for a probable cause 
analysis: 
In summary, where adequate and 
comprehensive records are 
maintained on a particular narcotics 
dog, and include results of controlled 
alerts made in training, as well as 
actual alelts in the field, the clog's 
reliability could be sufficiently 
established either through the records 
themselves or testimony from the 
dog's trainer who maintained the 
records. In this respect, the dog's 
alert is analogous to information 
provided by a reliable informant, and 
his alert without more could 
establish probable cause. 
However, where records are not kept 
or are insufficient to establish the 
dog's reliability, an alert by such a 
dog is much like hearsay from an 
anonymous informant, and 
corroboration is necessary to support 
the unproven reliability of the 
alerting dog and establish probable 
cause. To accept less would 
compromise the very principles that 
the requirement of probable cause 
was designed to protect. 
Id. at 1424. The court found support for this 
position from United States v. Nielsen, 9 
F.3d 1487, 1491 (lOth Cir. 1993) .... In 
sum, if the court relies only on training and 
certification records and fails to consider 
other factors concerning the dog's 
performance, then the court does not have a 
complete picture of the numerous 
circumstances that necessarily bear on the 
reasonableness of the officer's belief in the 
dog's reliability and whether the dog's alert 
in a particular case indicates a fair 
probability that there were drugs present 
inside the vehicle. 
For the above reasons, we adopt a totality of 
the circumstances approach and hold that the 
State, which bears the burden of establishing 
probable cause, must present all records and 
evidence that are necessary to allow the trial 
court to evaluate the reliability of the dog. 
The State's presentation of evidence that the 
dog is properly trained and certified is the 
beginning of the analysis. Because there is 
no uniform standard for training and 
certification of drug-detection dogs, the 
State must explain the training and 
certification so that the trial court can 
evaluate how well the dog is trained and 
whether the dog falsely alerts in training 
(and, if so, the percentage of false alerts). 
Further, the State should keep and present 
records of the dog's performance in the 
field, including the dog's successes (alerts 
where contraband that the dog was trained to 
detect was found) and failures ("unverified" 
alerts where no contraband that the dog was 
trained to detect was found). The State then 
has the opportunity to present evidence 
explaining the significance of any unverified 
alerts, as well as the dog's ability to detect 
or distinguish residual odors. Finally, the 
State must present evidence of the 
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experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog. Under a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, the court can then 
consider all of the presented evidence and 
evaluate the dog's reliability. 
Contrary to the dissent's assertion that we 
"impose[] evidentiaty requirements which 
can readily be employed to ensure that the 
police rely on drug detection dogs only 
when the dogs are shown to be virtually 
infallible," dissenting op. at 776, we do not 
hold in this case that the dog must be shown 
to be "virtually infallible." Just as it would 
be entirely relevant to know how many 
times an informant's tip resulted in 
contraband being discovered, the reason that 
the State should keep records of the dog's 
performance both in training and in the field 
is so that the trial court may adequately 
evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's 
belief in the dog's reliability under the 
totality of the circumstances. Because the 
State bears the burden of establishing 
probable cause, if the courts are to make 
determinations of probable cause based on 
the alerts of dogs, who can neither be cross-
examined nor otherwise independently 
assessed as to their reliability, it is 
appropriate to place the burden on the State 
to ensure uniformity in the way dogs are 
evaluated for reliability of their alelis. 
Nothing less than the sanctity of our 
citizens' constitutional rights to be secure 
from unreasonable searches and seizures in 
their homes, their vehicles, and their persons 
is at stake. 
THIS CASE 
In applying these standards to Harris's case, 
we hold that the trial comi erred in 
concluding that the State presented 
sufficient evidence to establish probable 
cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
Harris's truck. We defer to a trial comi's 
findings of fact as long as they are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but we 
review de novo a trial comi's application of 
the law to the historical facts. See Connor, 
803 So.2d at 608; Pagan, 830 So.2d at 806. 
However, in this case, the trial court did not 
make findings of historical fact. 
The State presented the following evidence: 
Aldo had been trained to detect drugs since 
January 2004 and certified to detect drugs 
since February 2004; Officer Wheetley 
trains Aldo for approximately four hours per 
week, deploys Aldo approximately five 
times per month, and attends a fOliy-hour 
annual training seminar; and Aldo's success 
rate during training is "really good." Aldo's 
weekly training records reveal that from 
November 2005 to June 2006, Aldo 
performed satisfactorily 100% of the time. 
However, there was no testimony as to 
whether a satisfactory performance includes 
any false alerts. The record is also scarce on 
the details of Aldo's training, including 
whether the trainer was aware of the 
locations of the drugs and whether the 
training simulated a variety of environments 
and distractions. 
The State also did not introduce Aldo's field 
performance records so as to allow an 
analysis of the significance of the alerts 
where no contraband was found. In fact, 
Officer Wheetley testified that he does not 
keep records of Aldo's unverified alerts in 
the field; he documents only Aldo's 
successes. If an officer fails to keep records 
of his or her dog's performance in the field, 
the officer is lacking knowledge important 
to his or her belief that the dog is a reliable 
indicator of drugs. Cj Florida v. J.L., 529 
U.S. 266 (2000). 
The State asserts that the only relevant 
records are the training records-not field 
records-since there is no such thing as a 
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false alert in the field because a dog alerts to 
both actual drugs and residual odors. Thus, 
the State argues, when a dog alerts in the 
field and no contraband is found, there is no 
way to determine whether the dog was 
alerting to a residual odor or whether the 
dog falsely alerted. This is also of concern 
when probable cause for the search hinges 
on the dog's demonstrated reliability and 
thus the probability that the dog's alert 
indicates that contraband was present in the 
vehicle at the time of the alert. Because the 
State did not introduce field performance 
records, the State was not able to explain the 
significance of any unverified alerts in the 
field. 
Further, the State failed to present any 
evidence regarding the criteria necessary for 
AIda to obtain certification through Drug 
Beat K-9 certifications. This case is unlike 
Coleman, where evidence was introduced 
outlining the details of the training program, 
the criteria for choosing which dogs to use 
as drug dogs, and the criteria necessary for 
the dog and handler to pass the course and 
obtain "cetiification." 911 So.2d at 260. By 
contrast, the only evidence regarding the 
criteria used in AIda's certification is a 
document simply stating that AIda 
successfully found twenty-eight grams of 
marijuana, five grams of methamphetamine, 
twenty-eight grams of cocaine, seven grams 
of heroin, seven grams of crack cocaine, and 
fifty grams of ecstasy. However, the record 
is silent on the circumstances of the 
certification, such as whether these drugs 
were hidden, whether the trainer was aware 
of the locations of the drugs, or whether the 
certification simulated the variety of 
environments and distractions found in the 
field. In the absence of uniform, standard 
criteria for certification, the State must do 
more than simply introduce evidence that 
the dog has been cetiified. 
In this case, there are several other factors 
that call into question AIda's reliability. 
First, the State failed to present any 
testimony regarding AIda's ability to detect 
residual odors. When asked how long a 
residual odor can remain on the driver's side 
door handle, Officer Wheetley stated that he 
was not qualified to answer that question. 
While such testimony is not required, 
without this information, it is difficult to 
determine how this factor should apply, if at 
all. For example, in State v. Cabral, 159 
Md.App. 354 (2004), the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals held that even though 
testimony was presented that the dog could 
have alerted to a residual odor that was 
seventy-two hours old, "such an ability 
serves to strengthen the argument that the 
dog has a superior sense of smell on which 
to rely to support a finding of probable 
cause." Alternatively, a trial court may find, 
after evaluating the testimony and other 
evidence, that a dog's inability to distinguish 
between residual odors and actual drugs 
undermines a finding of probable cause. 
Second, the State has failed to explain why 
an alert to a residual odor on the door handle 
would give rise to probable cause in this 
case. Officer Wheetley testified that AIda 
alerted to the door handle and that, in his 
experience, this meant that somebody had 
touched or smoked narcotics and then 
transferred the odor to the door handle. 
Officer Wheetley further indicated that 
AIda's aleti led him to believe that the odor 
of narcotics was present on the door handle. 
However, neither Officer Wheetley nor the 
State has explained in this case why 
evidence of residual odor of narcotics on the 
vehicle's door handle gave rise to probable 
cause that there were drugs actually present 
in the vehicle at the time of the aleti. AIda's 
alert to the door handle in this case, standing 
alone, provides no basis for an objective 
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probable cause determination that drugs 
were present inside the vehicle. 
Thus, we conclude that the State did not 
meet its burden in demonstrating that 
Officer Wheetley had a reasonable basis for 
believing that Aldo was reliable at the time 
of the search and, thus, that Aldo's alert, the 
linchpin of the probable cause analysis in 
this case, indicated a fair probability that 
drugs would be found in the vehicle. 
Although the trial court found probable 
cause, the trial court did not make a specific 
finding as to Aldo's reliability. The failure 
to make a finding on Aldo's reliability 
makes it difficult to determine how much 
weight to give Aldo's alert in the probable 
cause analysis. 
Although not part of the determination of 
whether probable cause to conduct the 
search existed at that time, two additional 
facts in this case are illustrative of why it is 
important to engage in an inquiry of a dog's 
reliability, including an evaluation of the 
dog's performance in the field. First, as to 
the search in question, the police officer did 
not discover any drugs that Aldo was trained 
to detect. In other words, there is a chance 
that this case may have involved a false 
alert. Second, Harris introduced evidence in 
this case that Aldo alerted to the same door 
handle on the same vehicle subsequent to 
this arrest and no drugs were found. 
The State argues that the alert at issue in this 
case and the subsequent alert were not false 
alerts because Aldo was alerting to residual 
odor on the door handle; Officer Wheetley 
also testified that when a dog alerts to a door 
handle it usually means that residual odor 
was transferred to the door handle by 
someone who had handled drugs. However, 
an alert to residual odor on the door handle, 
by itself, indicates only that someone who 
has come into contact with drugs touched 
the door handle at some point. 
In sum, we conclude that the State has failed 
to meet its burden of establishing probable 
cause. In the absence of a reliable alert, the 
other factors considered in the totality of 
circumstances analysis-Harris's expired 
tag, Harris's shaking, breathing rapidly, and 
inability to sit still, and Harris's open beer 
can-do not rise to the level of probable 
cause that there were illegal drugs inside the 
vehicle. Accordingly, the search of the 
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seIzures. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we quash Harris and 
disapprove Coleman and Laveroni. We 
approve Gibson and Matheson to the extent 
that they are consistent with this opinion. 
We hold the fact that a drug-detection dog 
has been trained and certified to detect 
narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the reliability of the dog. To 
demonstrate that an officer has a reasonable 
basis for believing that an aleIt by a drug-
detection dog is sufficiently reliable to 
provide probable cause to search, the State 
must present evidence of the dog's training 
and certification records, an explanation of 
the meaning of the particular training and 
certification, field performance records 
(including any unverified alerts), and 
evidence concerning the experience and 
training of the officer handling the dog, as 
well as any other objective evidence known 
to the officer about the dog's reliability. The 
trial court must then assess the reliability of 
the dog's alert as a basis for probable cause 
to search the vehicle based on a totality of 
the circumstances. Because in this case the 
totality of the circumstances does not 
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support a probable cause determination, the 
trial court should have granted the motion to 
suppress. We remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, c.J., 
dissents with an opinion. POLSTON, J., 
recused. 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
Because the majority imposes an evidentiary 
burden on the State which is based on a 
misconception of the federal constitutional 
requirement for probable cause, I dissent. I 
would affirm the decision of the First 
District Court of Appeal on review. 
In brief, the elaborate and inflexible 
evidentiary requirements the majority adopts 
are inconsistent with the proper 
understanding of probable cause as a 
"'practical, non-technical conception' that 
deals with 'the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act. '" Maryland v. Pringle, 540 
U.S. 366 (2003). In its effOli to manage the 
conduct of law enforcement, the majority 
strays beyond what is necessary to 
determine if the Fourth Amendment's 
proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" has been violated. In establishing 
requirements for determining the lawfulness 
of a search based on the alert of a drug 
detection dog, the majority demands a level 
of certainty that goes beyond what is 
required by the governing probable cause 
standard. 
The process of determining whether a search 
was reasonable because it is based on 
probable cause "does not deal with hard 
celiainties, but with probabilities." Texas v. 
Bmwn, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). The 
probable cause standard "merely requires 
that the facts available to the officer would 
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief''' that "evidence of a crime" may be 
found. Id. "[I]t does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false." Id. Instead, the 
probable cause standard requires simply that 
the search be justified by what the officer 
reasonably believes to be "reasonably 
trustwOlihy information." Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The 
majority here, however, imposes evidentiary 
requirements which can readily be employed 
to ensure that the police rely on drug 
detection dogs only when the dogs are 
shown to be virtually infallible. 
The record shows that the searching officer 
had an objectively reasonable basis for 
crediting the dog's alert. The State presented 
uncontroverted evidence that Aldo had been 
trained to detect drugs since January 2004 
and certified to detect drugs since February 
2004. Officer Wheetley testified that he 
trained Aldo approximately four hours per 
week, deployed Aldo approximately five 
times per month, and attended a forty-hour 
annual training seminar. Wheetley described 
Aldo's success rate during training as "really 
good." Aldo's weekly training records 
reveal that from the November 2005 to June 
2006, Aldo performed satisfactorily 100 
percent of the time. Harris failed to present 
any evidence challenging Aldo's training or 
certification. Based on this record of 
historical facts, the majority's conclusion 
that the officer acted unconstitutionally IS 
totally unwarranted. See Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171 (2009). 
Since there was no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the decision of the First 
District should be affirmed. 
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"Justices to Decide Whether Detailed Proof is Needed in 
Court on Drug Dog's Effectiveness" 
The Washington Post 
March 26, 2012 
Associated Press 
The Supreme Court will decide whether 
detailed documentation is necessary in court 
to prove that drug-sniffing dogs are effective 
at finding contraband and drugs. 
The high court decided Monday to hear an 
appeal by Florida officials of the work done 
by Aldo, a drug-sniffing dog used by the 
Liberty County sheriff. 
The Florida Supreme Court threw out drug 
evidence obtained against Clayton Harris 
during a 2006 traffic stop. Aldo alerted his 
officer to drugs used to make 
methamphetamine inside the truck. But two 
months later, Harris was stopped again, 
Aldo again alerted his officer to the presence 
of drugs but none were found. 
The state court ruled that saying a drug dog 
has been trained and certified to detect 
narcotics is not enough to establish the dog's 
reliability in court. 
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"Florida Supreme Court Tosses Evidence 
Detected by Drug-Sniffing Dogs" 
The Tampa Bay Times 
April 22, 2011 
Citing a lack of state standards for drug-
sniffing dogs, the Florida Supreme Court on 
Thursday tossed out evidence a canine 
detected against a Panhandle man. 
The 5-1 decision will make it more difficult 
for prosecutors to get court approval to use 
evidence sniffed out by trained dogs. But it 
shouldn't hamper the ability of police to use 
the animals, said Assistant State Attorney 
Ted Daus, who specializes in drug cases in 
Broward County. 
"Because a dog cannot be cross-examined 
like a police officer on the scene whose 
observations often provide the basis for 
probable cause to search a vehicle, the state 
must introduce evidence concerning the 
dog's reliability," Justice Barbara Pariente 
wrote for the court. 
Given the lack of statewide standards for 
single-purpose, drug-detecting dogs, training 
certificates and records aren't enough, 
Pariente wrote. 
Prosecutors also must present evidence 
including field performance records and an 
explanation of each dog's training. Proof of 
the experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog also is needed. FUliher, it's 
the state's responsibility to prove a dog is 
reliable, not the defendant's burden to show 
otherwise, but Daus said that's not really a 
change. 
The prosecutor said the high cOUli has not 
changed the standards for the dogs, but it 
has increased the proof needed to verify 
their reliability. He said it will turn what has 
been a 15- to 20-minute procedure into one 
that may take a couple of hours. 
"Now, I have to put the proof III the 
pudding," Daus said. 
Chief Justice Charles Canady dissented. 
"The majority demands a level of certainty 
that goes beyond what is required by the 
governing probable cause standard," Canady 
wrote. He added the dogs will need "to be 
virtually infallible." 
The U.S. Supreme Court approved drug-
sniffing dogs to check vehicles during 
routine traffic stops in 2005, but their 
accuracy has remained an issue. 
The Oregon Supreme Court also set 
reliability criteria in a pair of rulings earlier 
this month, and a Chicago Trib1lne analysis 
of Illinois data in January showed the dogs 
are wrong more often than they are right. 
Last week, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 
in another case that police must get a 
warrant before using drug-sniffing dogs at 
the front door of a home. 
Attorney General Pam Bondi said she would 
appeal that ruling to the U.S. Supreme 
COUli. Her office had no immediate 
comment on the latest decision. 
It reversed a 1 st District Court of Appeal 
ruling that had upheld a judge's refusal to 
suppress drug evidence obtained against 
Clayton Harris during a 2006 traffic stop in 
Liberty County. 
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Sheriffs Deputy William Wheetley's dog 
Aldo alerted to the driver's side door handle 
after Harris refused to consent to a search of 
his truck. Wheetley found more than 200 
pseudoephedrine pills under the driver's seat 
and 8,000 matches in eight boxes on the 
passenger's side. A later search turned up 
muriatic acid in a toolbox. All three items 
are used to make methamphetamine. Two 
months later, Wheetiey again stopped Harris 
for a traffic infraction and Aldo again 
alerted to the door handle, but this time no 
illegal drugs were found. 
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"The Reliability of Drug Sniffing Dogs" 
Conc1Irring Opinions 
April 1,2012 
Erica Goldberg 
Of the many things that make my Criminal 
Procedure students cynical about the 
Supreme Court, perhaps the most frustrating 
is that the Court has refused to quantify the 
probable cause standard. The Supreme 
Court's grant of certiorari last week in 
Florida v. Harris gives the Court the perfect 
opportunity to at least place probable cause 
within some numerical band. 
Harris is a particularly good vehicle for 
making the probable cause standard less 
fuzzy. In Harris, the Florida Supreme Court 
confronted the issue of when a dog's 
positive alert gives the police probable cause 
to search a vehicle. Unlike in most· 
assessments of probable cause, which 
involve informants or suspicious seeming 
individuals, police have data that quantifies 
the accuracy of drug sniffing dogs. A dog's 
field history includes its rate of false 
positives, when a dog alerts to the smell of 
drugs that are not actually present in the 
vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held 
that a dog's field history must be introduced 
as part of the probable cause inquiry. If the 
lower court's opmIOn is upheld, the 
Supreme Court should tell us what sort of 
false positive rate is too unreliable to permit 
a full search of a car. 
Courts consistently and expressly eschew 
technical conceptions of probable cause in 
order to provide police officers with 
flexibility to exercise their judgment in 
unfolding situations. In addition, courts 
focus on whether an officer has a reasonable 
belief that a suspect has committed or is 
committing a crime. This metric allows for 
probable cause to be found in situations 
where one reasonable officer might assess 
an 80% likelihood that a suspect is driving 
drunk, for example, even if another 
reasonable officer might think there is only a 
40% likelihood. We might be tempted to 
assume the courts require that a reasonable 
officer be able to believe a crime has been 
committed by greater than a 50% likelihood, 
but this has not been made explicit. All 
officers must prove to a court assessing a 
vehicle search is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt. FUliher, when a court is 
making a probable cause determination for 
itself in determining if a warrant should 
issue, it must decide only if there is a "fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place." 
What is a fair probability? 
In the context of drug detection dogs, where 
we have actual data on reliability, assigning 
a numerical value to probable cause-or at 
least to the maximum false positive 
percentage upon which an officer can rely-
would add much needed clarity to Fourth 
Amendment law. It also does not undermine 
police officers' ability to use their intuition, 
because the event precipitating a search is 
not an officer's informed judgment, but the 
alert from a dog. 
The use of a drug detection dog by itself is 
not considered a "search" that implicates 
Fourth Amendment protections, but if the 
dog alerts to the smell of drugs, the police 
presume that they have the probable cause 
required under the Fourth Amendment to 
conduct an actual search of your vehicle. 
However, if a particular dog is prone to false 
positives, it cannot be said that there is a 
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"fair probability" that contraband will be 
found. As is expected in Fourth Amendment 
law, the Florida Supreme Court opted to use 
a "totality of the circumstances" approach to 
assessing whether a dog's positive alert 
yields probable cause, which the Florida 
court defined as whether "the officer had a 
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be 
reliable." Florida courts now must consider 
the dog's and the officer's training, field 
performance records of the dog, and 
anything else that bears on the dog's 
reliability. 
The Supreme Court may have granted cert 
in Harris to overturn what it considers an 
unduly burdensome evidentiary requirement 
on the police. However, if the Florida 
Supreme Court's decision is upheld, the 
Supreme Court should decide numerically 
what maximum false positive rate can still 
yield probable cause, given the totality of 
the circumstances. The Court should not 
require the introduction of a dog's false 
positive rate and then not advise lower 
courts on what rates are permissible to 
establish probable cause. If out of 100 
positive alerts to cocaine by a particular dog, 
the drug is found in only 50 of the cars, the 
Court should decide whether a police officer 
may search that car. Or, the Court should at 
least tell lower courts what false positive 
rates are inconsistent with probable cause as 
a matter of law. (Complicating this issue is 
the fact that a dog may alert to the residual 
odor of a drug that is no longer present in 
the car, and may not even belong to the car's 
owner. Should this be considered a false 
positive, since no contraband is presently in 
the car?) 
It would be a significant service to police, 
individuals, and my inquiring law students if 
the Court committed to a number and 
required police to be at least that certain 
before searching a vehicle. The virtues and 
vices of rendering the law clearer and more 
precise will be a theme for my blog posts in 
April. I am so grateful for this opportunity to 
guest blog for Concurring Opinions and 
look forward to posting for the rest of the 
month. 
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United States v. Bailey 
11-770 
Ruling Below: United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Bailey v. 
United States, 11-770,2012 WL 1969365. 
In 2005 Chunon Bailey left his apartment building as police were awaiting a search warrant in 
the vicinity. An unmarked police car followed Bailey and then police detained him and brought 
him back to the building. After the warrant arrived, the police searched the apartment and found 
drugs and weapons. They arrested Bailey and charged with possession with intent to distribute, 
possession of firearm by felon, and possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking 
crime. Bailey argued that police unconstitutionally detained him on the street and brought him 
back to the apmiment. The trial judge ruled that if police could detain someone who was leaving 
a place during a search, then police could also follow someone who has left the place being 
searched and bring him back. Bailey filed a motion for to vacate his conviction, which was 
denied. Bailey appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution 
of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity ofthe premises before the 
warrant is executed. 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Chunon L. BAILEY, also known as Polo, Defendant-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Decided July 6, 2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
CABRANES, Circuit Judge 
Chunon L. Bailey appeals from an August 
23, 2007 judgment of conviction entered by 
the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York (Joseph F. 
Bianco, Judge), sentencing him principally 
to concurrent terms of 300 and 120 months 
of imprisonment, a consecutive term of 60 
months of imprisonment, and five years of 
supervised release. Bailey was convicted, 
following a jury trial, of possession with 
intent to distribute at least five grams of 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(I) and 841 (b)(1)(B)(iii), possession 
of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 
U.S.c. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and 
possession of a firearm in fmiherance of a 
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 
U.S.c. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Bailey also 
appeals from a January 19, 2010 order by 
the District Court denying a motion to 
vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 ("§ 2255"). United States v. Bailey, 
No. 06-cr-232, 2010 WL 277069 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 19, 2010). 
393 
We are asked to decide: (1) whether the 
District Court erred in denying Bailey's 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during 
his detention because the search and seizure 
of Bailey's person and property were 
conducted in violation of his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. We hold that Bailey's 
detention during the search of his residence 
was justified pursuant to Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The District 
COUli therefore did not err in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during 
that detention. The District COUli's August 
23, 2007 judgment of conviction and its 
January 19,2010 order denying the § 2255 
motion are affirmed. 
BACKGROUND 
The following facts reflect the findings 
entered by the District Court in the 
proceedings below, and, unless otherwise 
indicated, are not in dispute. 
A. 
At 8:45 p.m. on July 28, 2005, Detective 
Richard Sneider ("Sneider") of the Suffolk 
County Police Depmiment ("SCPO") 
obtained a search warrant from the First 
District Court in the Town of Islip, New 
York for the "basement apartment of 103 
Lake Drive" in Wyandanch, New York, on 
the basis of information from a confidential 
informant. The search warrant provided that 
the apaliment was "believed to be occupied 
by an individual known as 'Polo', a heavy 
set black male with ShOli hair," and 
identified a "chrome .380 handgun" as the 
principal target of the search. The search 
warrant also stated that the basement 
apartment at 103 Lake Drive is "located at 
the rear of the premises[.]" The search 
warrant did not specify that access to the 
basement door at the rear of the house at 1 03 
Lake Drive is possible from both the 
basement apartment and from the house 
upstairs. 
At approximately 9:56 p.m. that evening, 
Sneider and Detective Richard Gorbecki 
("Gorbecki"), an eighteen-year veteran of 
the SCPO assigned to the special operations 
team for narcotics enforcement, observed 
two men-later identified as Chunon L. 
Bailey (the defendant) and Bryant 
Middleton ("Middleton")-exiting the gate 
at the top of the stairs that led down to the 
basement of 1 03 Lake Drive. Both Bailey 
and Middleton matched the description of 
"Polo" provided to Sneider by the 
confidential informant. They exited the yard 
of the house and entered a black Lexus 
parked in the driveway. Rather than confront 
Bailey and Middleton within view or earshot 
of the apartment, Sneider and Gorbecki 
watched as Bailey's car pulled out of the 
driveway and proceeded down the block.2 
After the car traveled about a mile from the 
house, the officers pulled the car over in the 
parking lot of a fire station. Approximately 
five minutes elapsed between Bailey's exit 
from the basement apartment at 103 Lake 
Drive and the stop. 
After pulling over the vehicle, the detectives 
conducted a "pat-down" of the driver, 
Bailey, and passenger, Middleton, to check 
for hard objects that could be used as 
weapons. At Sneider's request, Bailey 
identified himself and produced a driver's 
license bearing a Bay Shore, New York 
address. Nevertheless, he told Sneider that 
he was coming from his house at "103 Lake 
Drive" in Wyandanch, New York. 
Middleton also identified himself and told 
Gorbecki that Bailey was driving him home 
in order to comply with a 10:00 p.m. curfew 
imposed as a condition of Middleton's 
parole. Middleton stated that Bailey's 
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residence was 103 Lake Drive. At that point, 
the officers placed Bailey and Middleton in 
handcuffs and-in response to Bailey's 
inquiry as to why they were being 
"arrested"-informed both men that they 
were being detained, but not arrested, 
incident to the execution of a search warrant 
in the basement apartment of 1 03 Lake 
Drive. To that, Bailey responded, "I don't 
live there. Anything you find there ain't 
mine, and I'm not cooperating with your 
investigation. " 
Gorbecki drove Bailey's Lexus back to 103 
Lake Drive, while Bailey and Middleton 
were transpOlied back in a patrol car. Upon 
arrival, Bailey and Middleton were informed 
that, during the search, the SCPD "entry 
team" had discovered a gun and dmgs in 
plain view in the apartment. Bailey and 
Middleton were placed under arrest and 
Bailey's house and car keys were seized 
incident to arrest. Later that evening, an 
SCPO officer discovered that one of the 
keys on Bailey's key ring opened the door of 
the basement apartment. In total, less than 
ten minutes elapsed between Bailey's stop 
and his formal arrest. 
B. 
The evidence obtained during the search of 
Bailey's home and his statements to 
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki provided 
the basis for the government's indictment. 
Bailey moved, through counsel, to suppress 
the physical evidence (including his house 
and car keys) and his statements to 
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki, on the 
theory that he was unlawfully detained and 
searched III violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the 
District Court found Bailey's detention 
lawful under Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692 (1981). The District Court 
reasoned that the detectives' authority under 
Summers to detain Bailey incident to a 
search of the apartment was not strictly 
confined to the physical premises of the 
apartment so long as the detention occurred 
as soon as practicable after Bailey departed 
] 03 Lake Drive. ld. at 382. Moreover, the 
District Court concluded, in the alternative, 
that Bailey's detention was lawful as an 
investigative detention supported by 
reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968).Id. at 383-85. 
A nine-day trial with respect to Count One 
(possession with intent to distribute more 
than five grams of cocaine base in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1) and 
841(b)(l)(B)(iii)) and Count Three 
(possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i)) commenced on 
October 30, 2006. On November 8, 2006, 
the jury returned a guilty verdict with 
respect to both Counts. 
On December 5, 2008, Bailey filed a motion 
pursuant to § 2255 seeking to vacate his 
conviction and order a new trial. Bailey's 
sole argument was that his trial counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance by failing to introduce evidence 
that access to the basement door at the rear 
of 103 Lake Drive could be gained from 
either the basement apatiment or the house 
upstairs. Bailey asserted that when 
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki observed 
Bailey exit the gate at the back of the 
property on July 28, 2005, they could not 
have known whether he was leaving the 
basement apatiment (for which they had a 
search warrant) or the house upstairs (for 
which they did not). Bailey argued that this 
distinction was determinative in the District 
Court's adjudication of the suppression 
motion because the government could not 
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sustain his detention under Summers or 
provide the reasonable suspicion to sustain 
his detention under Terry without 
demonstrating conclusively that Bailey had 
emerged from the basement apartment. 
The District Court concluded that, even if 
the detectives had known that access to the 
basement hallway was possible from an 
apartment other than the basement 
apartment, they still would have had a 
reasonable basis to believe that Bailey and 
Middleton might have emerged from the 
property for which they had a search 
warrant. The detectives therefore had the 
authority under SlImmers to briefly detain 
Bailey in order to ascertain whether he was 
an occupant of the premises being searched. 
Indeed, as it turned out, the "undisputed 
evidence at the trial [was] that this door to 
the main house was not accessible to the 
basement tenant and that the main house 
was sealed off from the basement area." 
United States v. Bailey, 2010 WL 277069, at 
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,2010). 
Because the evidence regarding the layout of 
the house had no effect on the lawfulness of 
Bailey's detention, the District Court 
reasoned that Bailey had not demonstrated 
any prejUdice from his counsel's alleged 
failure to offer that evidence. Accordingly, 
Bailey had failed to satisfy the requirement 
of Strickland that a successful claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel 
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 466 
U.S. at 694. 
Bailey appeals from the final judgment of 
conviction entered by the District Court on 
August 22, 2007, as well as from the 
January 19, 2010 order denying Bailey's 
motion to vacate the conviction pursuant to 
§ 2255. On appeal, he makes substantially 
the same claims he made before the District 
Court in his suppression and § 2255 
motions. However, he limits his arguments 
on appeal to the lawfulness of his detention 
pursuant to Summers and Terry and the 
adequacy of his assistance at trial. Appellant 
Br. 31,49,55. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Appeals from the denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence and a motion to vacate a 
conviction pursuant to § 2255 are both 
governed under the same standard of review: 
we review the District COUli's factual 
findings for clear error and its conclusions 
of law de novo. United States v. LlIcky, 569 
F.3d 10 1, 105-06 (2d Cir.2009). A finding 
is clearly erroneous when "although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed." Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573 (1985). 
B. 
The basic parameters of our inquiry into the 
lawfulness of a challenged seizure are well-
known. The Fourth Amendment proscribes 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." In the 
absence of probable cause, a limited and 
temporary detention is generally permissible 
only if law enforcement can establish 
reasonable suspicion based on "specific and 
articulable facts" as measured by an 
objective standard. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-
22. The Fourth Amendment, however, 
"imposes no irreducible requirement of such 
suspicion." United States v. Martinez-
FlIerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). Instead, 
as in all questions under the Fourth 
Amendment, "the touchstone" of our 
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analysis "is reasonableness." Palacios v. 
B1Irge, 589 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir.2009). 
In Michigan v. S1Immers, 452 U.S. 692 
(1981), the Detroit police encountered 
George Summers descending the front steps 
of his house while they were preparing to 
execute a search warrant of the premises. 
Summers was detained during the search 
and subsequently arrested when narcotics 
were found in the house. ld. at 693. The 
Supreme Comi upheld the initial detention, 
explaining that "a warrant to search for 
contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to detain the occupants of the 
premises while a proper search is 
conducted." ld at 705. That is, the Court 
concluded that the detention of "occupants" 
even without individualized suspicion 
during the execution of a valid search 
warrant is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The S1Immers Court explained that 
compared with "the inconvenience [and] the 
indignity associated with a compelled visit 
to the police station," id. at 702, the 
character of the "incremental intrusion" 
caused by detention is slight and the 
justifications for detention are substantial. 
ld. at 703. In particular, the Court justified 
the detention of George Summers by 
reference to the interests of law enforcement 
in (1) "preventing flight in the event that 
incnmmating evidence is found"; (2) 
"minimizing the risk of harm to the 
officers"; and (3) facilitating "the orderly 
completion of the search." ld. at 702-03. 
Moreover, the Court observed that once "[ a] 
judicial officer has determined that police 
have probable cause to believe that someone 
in the home is committing a crime[,] . . . 
[t]he connection of an occupant to that home 
gives the police officer an easily identifiable 
and certain basis for determining that 
SuspICIOn of criminal activity justifies a 
detention of that occupant." ld. at 703-04. 
Weare now asked to decide whether the 
same authority pursuant to which police 
officers may detain an occupant at the 
premises during the execution of a search 
warrant permits them to detain an occupant 
who leaves the premises during or 
immediately before the execution of a search 
warrant and is detained a few blocks away. 
While we have extended Summers to permit 
the detention of individuals entering a 
vehicle in the driveway of a house, the 
question presented here is a matter of first 
impression in our Circuit. 
This question has divided the Courts of 
Appeals. Of the five comis to consider it, 
three have extended S1Immers on facts 
similar to those of this case. In United States 
v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.1991), for 
example, police officers went to the 
defendant's residence to execute a search 
warrant and observed the defendant leaving 
the premises. ld. at 338. The officers did not 
want to forcibly enter the premises knowing 
that there was a guard dog inside, and they 
therefore stopped the defendant ShOlily after 
he exited the house. ld. The Sixth Circuit, 
relying on S1Immers, held that the detention 
was reasonable, concluding that "S1Immers 
does not impose upon police a duty based on 
geographic proximity ( [i.e.,] defendant must 
be detained while still on his premises); 
rather, the focus is upon police performance, 
that IS, whether the police detained 
defendant as soon as practicable after 
departing from his residence." ld. at 339. 
Similarly, in United States v. Cavazos, 288 
F.3d 706 (5th Cir.2002), police officers were 
conducting pre-execution surveillance when 
the defendant and two others left the 
residence in a truck. ld. at 708. The officers 
followed. ld. After the driver of the truck 
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demonstrated his awareness that he was 
being followed, the officers stopped the 
vehicle, took the defendant back to the 
residence, and detained him during the 
search. Id. The Fifth Circuit observed that, 
because the defendant's conduct "warranted 
the belief that [the defendant] would have 
fled or alerted the other occupants of the 
residence about the agents nearby if he were 
released immediately after the stop and 
frisk," the detention was justified under 
Summers. Id. at 711. Moreover, the Court 
concluded that the nexus between the 
defendant and the residence gave officers an 
"easily identifiable and certain basis for 
determining that suspicion of criminal 
activity justifie[ d] a detention of that 
occupant." Id. (quoting S1Immers, 452 U. S. 
at 703-04). 
Most recently, in United States v. Bullock, 
632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir.2011), officers 
conducting pre-execution surveillance 
observed the defendant exit the house and 
enter a vehicle with the resident of the house 
and her children. Id. at 1009. Officers 
followed the vehicle and executed a stop 
about ten to fifteen blocks from the house, 
transpOliing all of the occupants of the 
vehicle back to the house after notifying the 
driver that a search was underway. Id. The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that-in the 
absence of anything "to suggest that the 
vehicle was not pulled over as soon as 
practicable"-the conduct of the officers 
was reasonable. Id. at 1020. The Court 
observed that "[0 ]nce aware of the warrant, 
[Bullock] became a flight risk and a 
potential risk to the officers' safety in 
executing the warrant given his suspected 
illegal association with the residence." Id. 
Two circuits have declined to extend 
Summers to permit detention of occupants 
who have been seen leaving a residence 
subject to a search warrant. In United States 
v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1 994), 
officers were conducting pre-execution 
surveillance when the defendant left the 
premises. Id. at 345. The officers stopped 
him a block away, informed him that they 
had a warrant to search the house, and 
detained him during the search. Id. at 345-
46. The Eighth Circuit determined that, 
because the defendant had left the area and 
was unaware of the warrant, the officers did 
not have any interest in preventing his flight; 
the Court therefore held that Summers was 
inapplicable. Id. at 346. Nevertheless, the 
Court concluded that the police had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant; in light of the 
legal arrest, "the crack and cash discovered 
in a later search of his person was legally 
seized as a search incident to arrest." Jd. at 
347. 
Second, in United States v. Edwards, 103 
F .3d 90 (10th Cir.1996), police were 
conducting pre-execution surveillance of a 
"drug house" when the defendant, an ex-
convict in a drug rehabilitation program, left 
the building. Id. at 91. The officers detained 
him on the street for forty-five minutes. Id. 
Like the Eighth Circuit in Sherrill, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that because the defendant 
was unaware that a warrant was being 
executed, he had no reason to flee. Id. at 94. 
Furthermore, the COUli reasoned that the 
defendant did not pose a risk of harm to the 
officers and his detention played no pati in 
facilitating the orderly completion of the 
search.ld. 
We agree with the District Court that the 
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have the 
better of this argument. The guiding 
principle behind the requirement of 
reasonableness for detention ill such 
circumstances is the de minimis intrusion 
characterized by a brief detention in order to 
protect the interests of law enforcement in 
the safety of the officers and the 
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preservation of evidence. See Summers, 452 
U.S. at 701. We agree with the District 
Court that "[t]here is no basis for drawing a 
'bright line' test under Summers at the 
residence's curb and finding that the 
authority to detain under S1lmmers always 
dissipates once the occupant of the residence 
drives away." Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at 379. 
While the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
apparently concluded that once an occupant 
leaves a premises subject to search without 
knowledge of the warrant, S1lmmers is 
inapplicable because he ceases to (1) be a 
threat to the officers' safety, (2) be in a 
position to destroy evidence, or (3) be able 
to help facilitate the search, we conclude 
that it is the very interests at stake in 
S1lmmers that permit detention of an 
occupant nearby, but outside of, the 
premises. Indeed, adopting the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits' view as the law of the 
Circuit would put police officers executing a 
warrant in an impossible position: when they 
observe a person of interest leaving a 
residence for which they have a search 
warrant, they would be required either to 
detain him immediately (risking officer 
safety and the destruction of evidence) or to 
permit him to leave the scene (risking the 
inability to detain him if incriminating 
evidence was discovered). Summers does 
not necessitate that Hobson's choice, 
particularly when "[ a] judicial officer has 
determined that police have probable cause 
to believe that someone in the home is 
committing a crime." S1lmmers, 452 U.S. at 
703. Indeed, to accept that argument would 
be to strip law enforcement of the capacity 
to "exercise unquestioned command of the 
situation," id., at precisely the moment when 
S1lmmers recognizes they most need it. 
The District Court was therefore correct 
when it noted that "Summers . .. appl[lies] 
with equal force when, for officer safety 
reasons, police do not detain the occupant on 
the curbside, but rather wait for him to leave 
the immediate area and detain him as soon 
as practicable." Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at 
381 n. 4.6 That is, Summers imposes upon 
police a duty based on both geographic and 
temporal proximity; police must identify an 
individual in the process of leaVing the 
premises subject to search and detain him as 
soon as practicable during the execution of 
the search. As the Fifth Circuit concluded in 
Cavazos, while "[t]he proximity between an 
occupant of a residence and the residence 
itself may be relevant in deciding whether to 
apply Summers, . . . it is by no means 
controlling." 288 F.3d at 712. 
Against that standard, we have no trouble 
concluding that Bailey's detention was 
lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The 
officers' decision to wait until Bailey had 
driven out of view of the house to detain 
him out of concern for their own safety and 
to prevent alerting other possible occupants 
was, in the circumstances presented, 
reasonable and prudent. There is no question 
that because the target of the search warrant 
was a gun, Bailey-who matched the 
description of "Polo" provided by the 
confidential informant-posed a risk of 
harm to the officers. As the Supreme Comi 
stated in S1lmmers, "the execution of a 
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of 
transaction that may give rise to sudden 
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or 
destroy evidence." 452 U.S. at 702. In light 
of the fact that the officers had reason to 
suspect that the occupant of 103 Lake Drive 
sold drugs out of the house and had a gun in 
his possession, it was reasonable for the 
officers to assume that detaining Bailey 
outside the house might lead to the 
destruction of evidence or unnecessarily risk 
the safety of the officers. These are precisely 
the concerns that justified the limited 
intrusion in S1lmmers, 452 U.S. at 701-03. 
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Finally, Bailey's detention was not 
"unreasonably prolong[ed]." United States v. 
Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir.20 10). He 
was detained for less than ten minutes 
before he was taken back to 103 Lake Drive. 
By the time he returned to the site of the 
search, the search was underway and he was 
formally placed under arrest within five 
minutes of the entry team's execution of the 
warrant. Of equal importance, officers did 
not attempt to exploit the detention by trying 
to obtain additional evidence from Bailey 
during execution of the search warrant. 
Because the officers acted as soon as 
reasonably practicable in detaining Bailey 
once he drove off the premises subject to 
search, we conclude that his detention 
during the valid search of the house did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The District 
Court did not err in denying Bailey's motion 
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 
of his detention. Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at 
382. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, we conclude that: 
(1) Bailey's detention during the search of 
his residence was justified pursuant to 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), 
because he was (a) an occupant of propeliy 
subject to a valid search warrant, (b) seen 
leaving the premises during the execution of 
the warrant, and (c) detained as soon as 
reasonably practicable thereafter. 
The District Court's August 23, 2007 
judgment of conviction and its January 19, 
2010 order denying Bailey's § 2255 motion 
are affirmed. 
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"Supreme Court to Decide Chunon Bailey Case on Whether 
Police Can Detain Without a Warrant" 
USA Today 
June 4, 2012 
Associated Press 
The Supreme Court will decide whether 
police can follow and detain a suspect while 
they wait for a search warrant, even after the 
suspect leaves the area that the police want 
to search. 
The high court on Monday agreed to hear an 
appeal from Chunon Bailey, who was 
sentenced to 30 years in prison on drug and 
weapons charges. 
Bailey left a building with an apatiment that 
police wanted to search for a gun before the 
warrant arrived. An unmarked police car 
followed Bailey for more than a mile, and 
police detained him and brought him back to 
the building. The warrant arrived, police 
found drugs and weapons and arrested 
Bailey, who had an apartment key in his 
pocket. 
Bailey said police unconstitutionally stopped 
him on the street and brought him back to 
the apartment. But the trial judge ruled that 
if police could detain someone who was 
leaving a place during a search, then police 
could also follow someone who has left the 
place being searched and bring them back. 
The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to throw out his conviction, but 
other federal appeals courts have ruled that 
police cannot follow and detain people just 
to bring them back to a place that has not 
been searched yet. The Supreme Court will 
hear arguments in the fall. 
The case is Bailey v. United States, 11-770. 
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"Second Circuit Upholds Detention of Person Leaving 
Scene of Search Warrant" 
Taking the Fifth 
July 12,2011 
C. Zadik Shapiro 
In Michigan v. Summers the Supreme Court 
held that a search warrant for a residence 
allows officers to detain those in the 
residence during the search and that this 
right extended to a man leaving the 
residence as officers entered. In United 
States v. Bailey the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, last week, extended the permissible 
detention to an individual the officers saw 
drive away from the residence in order to 
allow them to follow and stop the individual. 
The officers then brought the individual 
back to the residence and detained him until 
the search was over. 
With a search warrant for a basement 
apartment at 103 Lake Drive in Wyandanch, 
New York officers arrived at the residence. 
They saw two men, one of them Chunon 
Bailey leave the unit and drive away. They 
followed the vehicle, stopped it and brought 
the men back to the residence. Bailey was 
detained and he was arrested after guns and 
drugs were found in the residence. 
In Summers the Supreme COUli provided 
three reasons to justify the detention of 
someone leaving a residence: (1 ) 
"preventing flight in the event that 
incriminating evidence is found"; (2) 
"minimizing the risk of harm to the 
officers"; and (3) facilitating "the orderly 
completion of the search." In a footnote the 
Second Circuit says that the first and second 
criteria apply. But it gives no facts to 
support this view. In another footnote it 
states that the police officers testified that 
the reason they didn't immediately detain 
Bailey was that they were afraid that by 
doing so they would alert anyone else in the 
house to the police presence and a 
dangerous situation may result. 
It is one thing to follow the Supreme Court's 
criteria. It is another to make a blanket 
holding. The Second Circuit held, "that 
Summers authorizes law enforcement to 
detain the occupant of premises subject to a 
valid search warrant when that person is 
seen leaving those premises and the 
detention is effected as soon as reasonably 
practicable." 
This issue may come before the Supreme 
COUli. The Circuit Courts are divided. The 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, like the 
Second Circuit, upheld detentions of people 
after they left the scene. The Eighth and the 
Tenth Circuits ruled to the contrary. They 
held that once a person left the residence the 
Summers criteria are no longer applicable. If 
the person leaves the scene without knowing 
that a surveilance is in progress then the 
officers are not in danger. The Second 
Circuit's response is that the officers are 
required to make a difficult decision: either 
to detain Bailey outside the residence and 
possibly notify those inside that the police 
are present or to let Bailey, who they call a 
"person of interest to leave without being 
detained. While the search warrant indicates 
that a judge found probable cause to believe 
that someone in the residence may have 
committed a crime at the time of the 
detention there was no individualized 
suspicion, as required by Terry that Bailey 
committed a crime and he should not have 
been detained. When you detain someone a 
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mile away from the house, return they to the 
house and require them to wait until the 
search is over it is no longer the minimal 
intrusion found by the Supreme Court In 
Summers. 
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King v. Maryland 
No.12A48 
Ruling Below: King v. State, 422 Md. 550 (2011). 
Alonzo Jay King Jr., was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. In 
accordance with §2-504(3) of the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected, 
analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree 
assault charge but while awaiting trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a 
DNA sample collected from a sexual assault victim in an unsolved 2003 rape. Maryland law 
enforcement authorities cited the DNA evidence as probable cause for a grand jUly indictment of 
King on the rape charge. Later, a search warrant for collection from King an additional reference 
DNA sample, which matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was convicted of first-
degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed, arguing that taking his DNA sample 
that linked him to the 2003 rape violated his Fourth Amendment right. 
Question Presented: 1. Did the trial court err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress DNA 
evidence obtained through a warrantless search conducted without any individualized suspicion 
of wrongdoing? 2. Did the court below improperly shift the burden of proof to the defense to 
demonstrate that a search or seizure made without individualized suspicion is unreasonable? 
Alonzo Jay KING, Jr. 
v. 
STATE of Maryland. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Filed April 24,2012 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
HARRELL, Judge 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
The tale of this case began on 10 April 2009, 
when appellant was arrested in Wicomico 
County, Maryland, on first- and second-
degree assault charges unrelated to the rape 
charge underlying the prosecution of the 
present case. Prior to the disposition of the 
assault charges, because King was charged 
with a crime of violence, the Act authorized 
collection of a DNA sample. Personnel at 
the Wicomico County Central Booking 
facility used a buccal swab to collect a DNA 
sample from King on the day of his arrest. 
The sample was received and processed by 
the Maryland State Police Forensic Sciences 
Division and later analyzed by a private 
vendor laboratory. On 13 July 2009, the 
DNA record was uploaded to the Maryland 
DNA database. Detective Barry Tucker of 
the Salisbury Police Department received 
notice from the State Police, on 4 August 
2009, that there had been a "hit" on King's 
DNA profile in an unsolved rape case. 
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The DNA database "hit" identified King's 
DNA profile as a match to a profile 
developed from a DNA sample collected in 
a 2003 unsolved rape case in Salisbury, 
Maryland. In that case, on 21 September 
2003, an unidentified man broke into the 
home ofVonette W., a 53-year-old woman, 
and raped her. Salisbury Police officers 
arranged for the victim to be transported to 
Peninsula Regional Medical Center, where 
she underwent a sexual assault forensic 
examination. Semen was collected from a 
vaginal swab. The swab was processed and 
the DNA profile uploaded to the Maryland 
DNA database. No matches resulted at that 
time. Vonette W. was unable to identify the 
man who attacked her other than to say that 
he was African-American, between 20 and 
25 years old, five-foot-six inches tall, and 
with a light-to-medium physique. 
Detective Tucker presented the 4 August 
2009 DNA database "hit" to a Wicomico 
County grand jury which, on 13 October 
2009, returned an indictment against King 
for ten charges arising from the crimes 
committed against Vonette W., including 
first-degree rape. The DNA database "hit" 
was the only evidence of probable cause 
supporting the indictment. On 18 November 
2009, Detective Tucker obtained a search 
warrant and collected a second buccal swab 
from King. The second buccal swab 
matched also the sample collected from 
Vonette W. during the 2003 sexual assault 
forensic examination. 
King filed in the Circuit Court for Wicomico 
County an omnibus motion that included a 
request to suppress evidence obtained 
through an illegal search and seizure. On 12 
February 2010, the Circuit Court held a 
hearing on the motion. 
On 26 February 2009, the hearing judge 
issued a memorandum opinion denying 
King's motion to suppress. The 
memorandum OpInIOn upheld the 
constitutionality of the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act's authorization to collect 
DNA from arrestees, citing to this Court's 
holding in State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 857 
A.2d 19 (2004), and concluded that the 
arrest of King on the 2009 assault charges 
and seizure of his DNA were presumed 
lawful; therefore, the defense bore the 
burden to prove that the warrant for the 
second DNA sample was invalid. 
On 26 March 2010, the same judge presided 
over a second hearing on King's motion to 
suppress in order to allow King to present 
evidence that the warrant was based on 
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The hearing judge concluded that King 
failed to meet his burden and denied again 
the motion to suppress. 
Ultimately, King plead not guilty to the 
charges arising from the 2003 rape of 
Vonette W., on an agreed statement of facts, 
in order to preserve his right to appeal the 
constitutional issues he raised. King was 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison, 
without the possibility of parole. On 12 
October 2010, King filed timely a notice of 
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but 
we issued a writ of certiorari on our 
initiative, King v. State, 422 Md. 353, 30 
A.3d 193 (2011), before the intermediate 
appellate comi could decide the appeal. 
We hold that § 2-504(3) of the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act, which allows DNA 
collection from persons arrested, but not yet 
convicted, for crimes of violence and 
burglary, is unconstitutional, under the 
Fourth Amendment totality of the 
circumstances balancing test, as applied to 
the relevant facts of this case because King's 
expectation of privacy is greater than the 
State's purpOlied interest in using King's 
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DNA to identify him for purposes of his 10 
April 2009 arrest on the assault charges. 
II. Standard of Review 
Reviewing a trial court's disposition of a 
motion to suppress evidence, we view the 
evidence presented at the hearing, along 
with any reasonable inferences drawable 
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, which, in the present 
situation, was the State. The reviewing court 
defers to the fact-finding of the hearing 
court, unless the findings are erroneous 
clearly. We apply, however, a non-
deferential standard of review when making 
the ultimate legal determination as to 
whether the evidence was seized properly 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
III. Discussion 
Appellant argues that the Fourth 
Amendment protects mere arrestees, who 
are cloaked with the assumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, from 
unreasonable, warrantless, and suspicionless 
seizures and searches of their genetic 
material made pursuant to the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, suppOlted 
by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The FOUlth Amendment is applicable to 
Maryland through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We evaluate Fourth 
Amendment challenges under the 
reasonableness test articulated by Justice 
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), a 
standard adopted by this Court in Venner v. 
State, 279 Md. 47, 51-52, 367 A.2d 949, 
952 (1977). The Katz reasonableness test 
requires first that the person have an "actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable. '" A seizure or search will be 
upheld even if there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when the government 
has a "special need." The State does little 
more than mention the special needs 
exception in the present case, for good 
reason, because its narrow confines do not 
embrace the case at bar. 
The context for evaluating the Fourth 
Amendment challenges where a reasonable 
expectation of privacy competes with 
government interests was set forth by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001). In Knights, the 
Supreme COUlt upheld a warrantless search 
of a probationer'S apartment, using the 
"totality of the circumstances" approach set 
forth in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996). Reasonableness m a Fourth 
Amendment analysis is determined by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual's 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate government interests. 
B. The Maryland DNA Collection Act 
The Maryland DNA Collection Act was 
enacted in 1994. The portions of the current 
statute challenged by Appellant were added 
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in 2008. The stated purpose of the statute is 
to "analyze and type the genetic markers 
contained in or derived from the DNA 
samples;" to assist an official investigation 
of a crime; to identify human remains; to 
identify missing persons; and for "research 
and administrative purposes," including the 
development of a population database and to 
aid in quality assurance. The 2008 
amendments affected primarily § 2-501(i), 
Definitions and § 2-504, Collection of DNA 
Samples. The amendments purport to allow 
the State to collect DNA samples from 
individuals arrested for crimes (or attempted 
crimes) of violence or burglary prior to 
being found guilty or pleading guilty. DNA 
samples are collected from arrestees when 
the individual is charged (or at a correctional 
facility if the arrestee is in custody) by an 
authorized collector trained in the collection 
protocols used by the Maryland State Police 
Crime Laboratory. Samples may be 
collected with reasonable force, if necessary, 
and are mailed to the Maryland State Police 
Crime Laboratory within 24 hours of 
collection. The samples are not tested or 
placed in the statewide DNA system until 
the first scheduled arraignment of the 
arrestee, or earlier if the arrestee gives 
consent. 
If an arrestee is not convicted of the charge 
or charges which lead to his/her qualifying 
arrest(s), the DNA samples and records are 
required to be destroyed or expunged by the 
authorities. There is no expungement 
allowed, however, if the precipitating charge 
or charges against an arrestee are placed on 
the stet docket or the arrestee received 
probation before judgment. The Act 
provides also for penalties for misuse of 
DNA records, unauthorized testing of DNA 
samples, or wilful failure to destroy DNA 
samples. 
In Raines, 383 Md. at 25, 857 A.2d at 33, a 
plurality of this Court upheld the 
constitutionality, against a Fourth 
Amendment challenge, of the then-extant 
DNA collection statutory scheme, which, 
prior to the 2008 amendments, provided for 
collection of DNA samples only from 
individuals convicted of felonies, fourth-
degree burglary, or breaking and entering 
into a vehicle. The Court, however, was 
divided deeply in reaching that result. The 
plurality opinion was authored by Judge 
Cathell. Two members of the four judge 
majority authored separate concurring 
opinions. 
Raines was convicted of two separate 
robberies committed in 1996. In 1999, while 
serving a sentence in prison for a crime 
unrelated to the robberies, his DNA was 
collected pursuant to the Act as it then 
existed, because the 1996 robberies were 
qualifying felonies. In 2002, the DNA 
profile from a 1996 unsolved rape was 
uploaded to the statewide database and 
found to match Raines's DNA profile 
collected in 1999. Using the DNA database 
hit as probable cause, the State obtained a 
search warrant to obtain a saliva sample 
from Raines in February 2003. As a result of 
the second DNA profile match and the 
testimony of the 1996 rape victim, a grand 
jury returned an indictment against Raines 
for first- and second-degree rape and 
robbery. Prior to his trial on the rape 
charges, Raines moved to suppress the DNA 
evidence, asserting that the original search 
was unconstitutional. The motions court 
agreed. The plurality opinion, on appeal, 
reversed the suppression of the evidence, 
noting that nearly every federal and state 
court that had decided an analogous question 
upheld against Fourth Amendment attack 
the collection of DNA from convicted 
felons. Using the balancing test for 
determining whether a search is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, the plurality 
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upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act, as applied to convicted 
felons. 
On the privacy interest side of the scales of 
the balancing test, the Court considered 
Raines's status as a convicted and 
incarcerated person as one with "severely 
diminished expectation of privacy." The 
plurality opinion diluted further Raines's 
expectation of privacy by crediting that the 
purpose of the DNA collection was to 
"identify" convicted felons; no incarcerated 
individual has an expectation of privacy in 
his or her identity. The Court distinguished 
the interest in searching for "identification" 
from searching "ordinary individuals for the 
purpose of gathering evidence against them 
in order to prosecute them for the very 
crimes that the search reveals." Using the 
Knights test, the COUli concluded that there 
is no reason why a search cannot be 
reasonable absent an individualized 
suspicion in the limited circumstances of 
this case, where the individual's expectation 
of privacy was even more limited than in 
Knights, the government intrusion, a buccal 
swab, was minimal at most and the 
government objective is as strong as in 
Knights. 
A government interest highlighted in Raines 
was to identify recidivists, persons involved 
with crimes, and unidentified bodies. Judge 
Raker's concurring opinion disagreed with 
the plurality opinion as to its conclusion of 
the severely limited expectation of privacy a 
convicted felon has in his/her bodily fluids, 
but upheld the statute based on her 
acceptance of the analogy between 
fingerprints and DNA profiles as providing 
purely identifying information. In a separate 
concurring opinion, Judge Wilner criticized 
the plurality opinion's characterization of 
the State's interest in the DNA as simply 
identification, calling it "misleading even to 
suggest, much less hold, that this program is 
not designed for the predominant purpose of 
providing evidence of criminality." He 
conceded, however, that convicted criminals 
have a high rate of recidivism and that 
DNA's reliability serves the government's 
interest in identification in the same way as 
fingerprints and photographs do. 
C. The Present Case 
We consider first whether King's 
constitutional challenge to the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act is as-applied, facially, 
or both. It is clear in the present case that 
King mounts both facial and as-applied 
Fourth Amendment challenges. 
Under Maryland common law, there is a 
strong presumption that statutes are 
constitutional. To succeed in an as-applied 
constitutional challenge, King must show 
that "under [ these] particular circumstances 
[he was] deprived ... of a constitutional 
right. " 
To evaluate King's as-applied challenge, we 
analyze the totality of the circumstances, 
using the Knights balancing test that weighs 
King's expectation of privacy on one hand 
and the state's interests on the other, keeping 
in mind that the "touchstone" of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is reasonableness. Our 
analysis is influenced also by the precept 
that the government must overcome a 
presumption that warrantless, suspicion less 
searches are per se unreasonable. As other 
courts have concluded, we look at any DNA 
collection effort as two discrete and separate 
searches. The first search is the actual swab 
of the inside of King's mouth and the second 
is the analysis of the DNA sample thus 
obtained, a step required to produce the 
DNA profile. Although some comis follow 
Mitchell in assessing the buccal swab 
technique as a quick and painless intrusion, 
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we shaH not ignore altogether the gravity of 
a warrantless search and collection of 
biological material from a mere arrestee. 
The State bears the burden of overcoming 
the arrestee's presumption of innocence and 
his expectation to be free from biological 
searches before he is convicted of a 
qualifying crime. If application of the 
balancing test results in a close call when 
considering convicted felons, as our deeply 
divided decision in Raines suggests, then the 
balance must tip surely in favor of our 
closely-held belief in the presumption of 
innocence here. King's expectation of 
privacy is greater than that of a convicted 
felon, parolee, or probationer, and the 
State's interests are more attenuated 
reciprocally. 
i. King's Expectation of Privacy 
King must have a personal, subjective 
expectation of privacy in order for Fourth 
Amendment protections to apply. 
We do not embrace wholly the analogy 
between fingerprints and DNA samples 
advanced in Judge Raker's concurring 
opinion in Raines and by the State in the 
present case. As aptly noted, fingerprints are 
a physical set of ridges on the skin of a 
person's fingers that, when exposed to ink 
(or other medium) and the resultant imprint 
placed on paper or electronic records, can 
determine usually and accurately a person's 
identity by matching the physical 
characteristics to a known set of 
fingerprints. DNA, on the other hand, is 
contained within our cells and is collected 
by swabbing the interior of a cheek (or 
blood draw or otherwise obtained biological 
material). While the physical intrusion of a 
buccal swab is deemed minimal, it remains 
distinct from a fingerprint. We must 
consider that "[t]he importance of informed, 
detached and deliberate determinations of 
the issue whether or not to invade another's 
body in search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great." 
The information derived from a fingerprint 
is related only to physical characteristics and 
can be used to identify a person, but no 
more. A DNA sample, obtained through a 
buccal swab, contains within it unarguably 
much more than a person's identity. 
Although the Maryland DNA Collection Act 
restricts the DNA profile to identifying 
information only, we cannot turn a blind eye 
to the vast genetic treasure map that remains 
in the DNA sample retained by the State. As 
Judge Wilner noted in his concurring 
opinion in Raines, 
A person's entire genetic makeup 
and history is forcibly seized and 
maintained in a government file, 
subject only to the law's direction 
that it not be improperly used and the 
prospect of a misdemeanor 
conviction if a custodian willflllly 
discloses it in an unauthorized 
manner. No sanction is provided for 
if the information is non-willfully 
disclosed in an unauthorized manner, 
though the harm is essentiaHy the 
same. 
Although arrestees do not have all 
the expectations of privacy enjoyed 
by the general public, the 
presumption of innocence bestows 
on them greater protections than 
convicted felons, parolees, or 
probationers. A judicial 
determination of criminality, 
conducted properly, changes 
drastically an individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The 
expungement provisions of the Act 
recogmze the importance of a 
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conviction in altering the scope and 
reasonableness of the expectation of 
privacy. If an individual is not 
convicted of a qualifying crime or if 
the original charges are dropped, the 
DNA sample and DNA profile are 
destroyed. The General Assembly 
recognized the full scope of the 
information collected by DNA 
sampling and the rights of persons 
not convicted of qualifying crimes to 
keep this information private. This 
right should not be abrogated by the 
mere charging with a criminal 
offense: the arrestee's presumption 
of innocence remains. 
We agree with the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals in C. T.L. that "establishing 
probable cause to arrest a person is not, by 
itself, sufficient to permit a biological 
specimen to be taken from the person 
without first obtaining a search warrant." A 
finding of probable cause for arrest on a 
crime of violence under the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act cannot serve as the probable 
cause for a DNA search of an arrestee. 
ii. Government Interest 
This Court accepted the State's argument in 
Raines that the purpose of the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act is to identify 
individuals, rather than to collect evidence. 
While that may be true in the context of 
maintaining a record of inmates, felons, 
parolees, or probationers (as was the case 
regarding the scope of the Act at the time 
Raines was decided), in the present case, 
identification is not what King's DNA 
sample was used for or needed, and, in most 
circumstances, will likely not be the case 
with other arrestees. Solving cold cases, in 
the State's view, is an ancillary benefit of 
determining the proper identification of an 
individual, but for King it was the only State 
interest served by the collection of his DNA. 
The State here cannot claim the same public 
safety interests present in cases addressing 
convicted felons, parolees, or probationers. 
There is no interest in prison safety or 
administration present. 
Although we have recognized (and no one 
can reasonably deny) that solving cold cases 
is a legitimate government interest, a 
warrantless, suspicionless search can not be 
upheld by a "generalized interest" in solving 
crimes. 
Courts upholding statutes authorizing DNA 
collection from arrestees rely on an 
expansive definition of "identification" to 
sweep-up "cold case" crime-solving as a 
government purpose recognized and 
approved previously by courts in other 
contexts. 
The State argues that it has a legitimate 
purpose in identifying accurately arrestees. 
Accepting this argument arg1lendo, the State 
presented no evidence that it had any 
problems whatsoever identifying accurately 
King through traditional booking routines. 
King had been arrested previously, given 
earlier fingerprint samples, and been 
photographed. There is no claim that King 
presented false identification when arrested 
or had altered his fingerprints or appearance 
in any way that might increase the State's 
legitimate interest in requiring an additional 
form of identification to be certain who it 
had arrested. 
The State's purpOlied interests are made less 
reasonable by the fact that DNA collection 
can wait until a person has been convicted, 
thus avoiding all of the threats to privacy 
discussed in this opinion. DNA profiles do 
not change over time (as far as science 
"knows" at present), so there is no 
reasonable argument that unsolved past or 
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future crimes will go unresolved necessarily. 
As regards to King's facial challenge to the 
Act, a party challenging facially the 
constitutionality of a statute "must establish 
that no set of circumstances exist under 
which the Act would be valid." In Salerno, 
the Supreme Court set out, in dictum, the 
"no set of circumstances" test that is used 
broadly to decide facial constitutional 
challenges; however, the over-arching 
distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges, in the wake of Salerno, has been 
less than clear. The Supreme Court, post-
Salerno, has not applied consistently the "no 
set of circumstances" test to facial 
challenges. Despite the unclear application 
of Salerno among the federal courts, we 
apply the test here according to Koshko. We 
conclude that King's facial challenge to the 
statute fails because there are conceivable, 
albeit somewhat unlikely, scenarios where 
an arrestee may have altered his or her 
fingerprints or facial features (making 
difficult or doubtful identification through 
comparison to earlier fingerprints or 
photographs on record) and the State may 
secure the use of DNA samples, without a 
warrant under the Act, as a means to identify 
an arrestee, but not for investigatory 
purposes, in any event. 
As we conclude that the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act, as applied to King as an 
arrestee, was unconstitutional, and King's 
10 April 2009 DNA sample was obtained 
illegally, we must conclude that the second 
DNA sample, obtained on 18 November 
2009, pursuant to a court order based on 
probable cause gained solely from the "hit" 
from the first compelled DNA sample, is 
suppressible also as a "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." The "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine excludes evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Under 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the 
defendant bears the burden of showing 1) 
primary illegality and 2) "the cause and 
effect relationship between the primary 
illegality and the evidence in issue, to wit, 
that the evidence was, indeed, the 
identifiable fruit of that paJiicular tree." 
Here, we have determined that the original 
DNA collection was illegal. The cause-and-
effect relationship between King's original 
buccal swab and the court-ordered second 
buccal swab is not attenuated in any way. 
The first buccal swab provided the sole 
probable cause for King's first-degree rape 
grand jury indictment. There was no other 
evidence linking King to the 2003 unsolved 
rape. Were it not for the buccal swab 
obtained illegally after King's assault arrest, 
there would be no second DNA sample 
which could have been used as evidence in 
King's trial for the charges enumerated in 
footnote seven, s1lpra. The DNA evidence 
presented at trial was a fruit of the poisonous 
tree. 
Judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Wicomico County reversed. Case 
remanded to that court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
BARBERA and WILNER, Justices 
dissent. 
I dissent. The Court decides today that the 
police violated King's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches, 
when the police, after arresting King based 
on probable cause that he had committed a 
violent crime, took a DNA sample via a 
buccal swab, pursuant to the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act, Maryland Code (2003, 2011 
RepI.Vol.), § 2-504(a)(3) of the Public 
Safety Article (Act). The question, then, is 
whether this warrantless search complied 
with the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment, the touchstone for which is 
"reasonableness." The test for asceliaining 
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the answer to the reasonableness inquiry is 
one adopted by the Supreme Court long ago, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20-21 (1968), 
and followed by this Court ever since. 
Under that test, whether a given warrantless 
search is reasonable requires balancing the 
privacy interests of the individual searched 
against the legitimate government interests 
promoted by the search. The test has been 
employed to uphold searches of persons in 
situations akin to the case at bar. 
The majority recognizes that the balancing 
test is the appropriate test to determine the 
reasonableness, and hence the 
constitutionality, of the search at issue here. 
Regrettably, both for the present case and all 
other future cases like it, the majority's 
application of the test to the circumstances 
here could not be more wrong. Proper 
analysis of the competing privacy and 
governmental interests at stake exposes the 
error. 
To repeat, "reasonableness" depends on a 
balance between the governmental interests 
and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by 
law officers. In assessing, first, the interests 
at stake for King, I bear in mind that 
consideration of the privacy interest 
implicated by the buccal swab involves 
identifying both the nature of the privacy 
interest enjoyed by King at the time of the 
swab and the character of the intrusion itself. 
The majority misstates the degree to which 
King's privacy was impinged by his arrest. 
Certainly, up to the moment of conviction, 
King enjoyed the presumption of innocence 
in connection with the crimes charged. Yet 
King's status as a presumed-innocent man 
has little to do with the reduced expectation 
of privacy attendant to his arrest, processing, 
and pre-trial incarceration (even if for but a 
short time). For purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment analysis, King's privacy 
expectation at the time of the cheek swab 
was far more like a convicted felon, 
probationer, and parolee than an uncharged 
individual. 
The majority's Fourth Amendment analysis 
also suffers from its mislabeling the 
character of the intrusion upon privacy and 
bodily integrity occasioned by the cheek 
swab, and the degree to which the arrestee's 
privacy interest is impinged as a result of the 
information obtained thereby. The buccal 
swab technique has been described as 
"perhaps the least intrusive of all seizures," 
and a "relatively noninvasive means of 
obtaining DNA" that "pose[ s] lowered risk 
for both the subject and laboratory 
personnel." 
Though surely a far more sophisticated and 
"new" means of identification than 
fingerprints, DNA analysis, when used 
solely for purposes of identification is, in the 
end, no different. Both are limited markers 
that can reveal only identification 
information. 
In this way, the numbers of a DNA profile 
are identical to the ridges of a fingerprint-
the information derived from both is, as the 
majority concedes, "related only to physical 
characteristics and can be used to identify a 
person, but no more." 
The Supreme Court has given, albeit 
impliedly, the constitutional "go ahead" for 
the fingerprinting procedure. Given the 
similarity of fingerprinting and the DNA 
collection authorized by the Act, there is 
little concern that the Act implicates a 
weighty privacy interest. 
On the other side of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness balancing equation is the 
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State's interest in the use and retention of 
DNA evidence. I need not discuss here the 
significance of all the government interests 
at stake, although there are at least three: 
identifying arrestees, solving past crimes, 
and exonerating innocent individuals. 
We emphasized in Raines that identifying 
perpetrators of crimes is a "compelling 
governmental interest." In responding to this 
strong law enforcement interest, the majority 
eludes faithful application of the case law on 
the subject of "identity," by carefully 
circumscribing its meaning. The majority 
reasons that "identity" includes only an 
individual's name, age, address, and 
physical characteristics, but does not include 
"what [the] person has done." Based on this 
reasoning, the majority notes that the 
government can claim no legitimate interest 
in identifying an individual for the purpose 
of uncovering past misdeeds. From that 
premise the majority holds that the Act is 
unconstitutional as applied to King because 
King's DNA collection was superfluous: the 
identification interest already was served by 
the fingerprinting and photographing of 
King. 
On the majority's first point, nothing in the 
law supports the majority's restrictive 
definition of identity. In the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme COUli has 
made clear that law enforcement's interest in 
identity extends to knowing whether a 
person has been involved in crime. The 
majority's definition raises the rhetorical 
question: "Why law enforcement would 
want to know a person's name, if not to 
know whether that person is linked to 
crime?" 
On the second point, the majority essentially 
holds that DNA collection cannot displace 
traditional methods of identification because 
those traditional methods are less intrusive 
and in use effectively. The COUli of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit III Haskell 
characterized such reasoning as "a Luddite 
approach" to Fourth Amendment 
interpretation. "Nothing in the Constitution 
compels us to . . . prevent the Government 
from using this new and highly effective 
tool [of identification] to replace (or 
supplement) older ones." Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has been clear in "repeatedly 
refus[ing] to declare that only the 'least 
intrusive' search practicable can be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 
Finally, as this Court recognized in Raines, 
"[i]t is not for us to weigh the advantages of 
one method of identification over another." 
Even assuming that the government's strong 
interest in identifying perpetrators of crime 
is the only interest at stake in this case 
(which it is not), that interest, when 
balanced against the significantly 
diminished expectation of privacy attendant 
to taking a buccal swab of an arrestee, 
yields, in my view, an obvious answer to the 
question presented in this case. The swab of 
King's inner cheek to extract material from 
which 13 DNA "junk" loci are tested to 
identify him is a reasonable search, and 
therefore permitted by the FOUlih 
Amendment. I therefore would affirm the 
judgment of the Circuit COUli for Wicomico 
County. 
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"Chief Justice Lets Maryland Continue 
to Collect DNA" 
The New York Times 
July 30,2012 
Adam Liptak 
Law enforcement officials in Maryland may 
continue to collect DNA samples from 
people charged with violent felonies while 
the Supreme Court considers whether to 
hear an appeal on the constitutionality of the 
practice, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. 
ruled on Monday in a brief order granting a 
stay of a state comi decision. 
In April, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the 
state's highest court, ruled that a state law 
authorizing DNA collection from people 
arrested but not yet convicted violated the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The case arose from the collection of DNA 
in 2009 from Alonzo Jay King Jr. after his 
arrest on assault charges. The DNA profile 
matched evidence from a 2003 rape, and he 
was convicted of that crime. 
The April decision overturned the rape 
conviction. "King, as an arrestee, had an 
expectation of privacy to be free from 
warrantless searches of his biological 
material," Judge Glenn T. Harrell Jr. wrote 
for the majority. 
In dissent, Judge Mary Ellen Barbera wrote 
that collecting DNA "by rubbing and 
rotating a cotton swab on the inside of an 
individual's cheek" is much less intrusive 
than searches that have been approved by 
the Supreme Court, including routine strip 
searches of people arrested for even minor 
crimes and held in the general jail 
population. 
Chief Justice Roberts, recItmg the usual 
standards for granting a stay of a lower-
court decision, said there was "a reasonable 
probability" that the Supreme Court would 
agree to hear the case. The Maryland 
decision conflicted, he said, with ones from 
the Virginia Supreme Court and federal 
appeals courts in Philadelphia and San 
Francisco. 
He added that collecting DNA from people 
accused of serious crimes is "an important 
feature of day-to-day law enforcement 
practice in approximately half the states and 
the federal government." 
The Maryland decision had consequences 
beyond its borders, Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote, because the samples the state 
collected might have been provided to a 
national database maintained by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. "The decision 
renders the database less effective for other 
states and the federal government," he 
wrote. 
There was a "fair prospect," Chief Justice 
Roberts went on, that the Supreme Court 
will ultimately reverse the Maryland 
decision. 
In the meantime, he said, the state would 
suffer irreparable harm if it could not use "a 
valuable tool for investigating unsolved 
crimes and thereby helping to remove 
violent offenders from the general 
population. 
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"DNA Sampling Case Develops" 
SCOTUSblog 
May 4,2012 
Lyle Denniston 
Maryland officials have set the stage for an 
appeal to the Supreme Court to revive their 
legal right to collect DNA samples from 
individuals who have been arrested, but not 
yet convicted of a crime-if the 
state's highest court cannot be persuaded to 
reconsider its partial ban on that procedure. 
The issue has divided lower federal and state 
cOUlis, and the case of King v. Maryland 
would appear to pose the issue in a simple 
and direct way-a rape conviction would 
fall, and getting a guilty verdict at a new 
trial could be in considerable doubt. 
State Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler 
asked the state comi at least to put its ruling 
on hold until after it could be tested in the 
Supreme Court. 
Maryland's DNA sampling law was 
originally passed in 1994, but was extended 
in 2008 to require sampling of those arrested 
and not yet convicted. The federal 
government and 25 of the 50 states have 
similar laws, and disputes over their 
constitutionality have arisen across the 
country. The Supreme Comi on March 19 
refused to hear a case involving a challenge 
to a DNA sample taken from a Pennsylvania 
man (Mitchell v. United States, docket 11-
7603), but the sample was not used in that 
case to identify the individual as the 
perpetrator of a different crime. 
Among the constitutional issues that have 
arisen over such DNA sampling laws, these 
are some of the most significant: 
* What level of privacy do arrested 
individuals have, compared to those actually 
found guilty of crimes? 
* How intrusive is a DNA sample, both in 
terms of the physical procedure of swabbing 
inside the mouth, and in terms of the amount 
of private information gathered by such a 
swab? 
* Do constitutional limits on it apply both to 
the original swabbing, and also to the later 
interpretation of the personal markers 
found? 
* For constitutional purposes, is using the 
DNA result to tie an individual to other 
crimes simply another form of identification, 
or is it a form of investigation of another 
crime? (In other words, can such a sample 
be used constitutionally only if it helps 
identify that arrested individual as the 
person the police want for that particular 
crime, or can it also be used validly to link 
that individual to other crimes, such as 
unsolved offenses ("cold cases")? 
* Is the constitutional equation different if a 
sampling law puts strict limits on what 
information from a sample may be used by 
prosecutors? (In other words, is there no 
constitutional problem if the sample reveals 
only what are called "junk" factors that 
really do not tell much about an individual's 
biological profile?) 
* And, if such a sampling procedure is 
invalid in some particular factual situations, 
may it remain on the books for other 
situations? (In other words, should such a 
law be struck down as written-that is, 
facially-or only as applied to specific 
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scenarios?) 
Maryland's highest court upheld the state's 
DNA sampling law in 2004, but only as it 
applied to those already convicted of serious 
crimes (felonies). But, in a 5-2 decision on 
April 24, the state tribunal found that the 
law could not be applied in the specific case 
of a Wicomico County man, Alonzo Jay 
King, Jr., and thus overturned his conviction 
for rape-a convIctIOn that depended 
heavily upon a link to him provided by a 
DNA sample taken after his arrest earlier for 
a separate assault case. (The state court 
turned down King's plea to strike down the 
law as written-that is, his "facial" 
challenge to it; it said there might be 
instances where the sample could be validly 
used when an arrested person's identity 
might be in question.) 
Under the state cOUli ruling, King can be 
prosecuted at a new trial, but Attorney 
General Gansler has told the state cOUli, in 
his reconsideration motion, that the DNA 
sample that the ruling bars as evidence is 
"the strongest piece of evidence linking" 
King to a rape. After his conviction for rape, 
King was sentenced to life in prison without 
parole. 
King had been arrested in 2009 for an 
assault that was treated as a violent crime. 
Because of that designation of his alleged 
offense, state law required that, upon his 
arrest, a DNA sample be taken by using a 
cotton swab inside his mouth to collect 
cellular material. That was done when he 
was booked into the Wicomico County jail. 
He also was identified by photograph and by 
his fingerprints. He was later convicted of 
second-degree assault, and was given a four-
year prison sentence, with three of those 
years suspended. 
Later, scientific interpretation of that sample 
linked King to a rape that occurred in 
September 2003. In that incident, which had 
remained a "cold case" for prosecutors, a 
53-year-old woman was raped by an 
African-American man whom she could not 
otherwise identify. The intruder held a gun 
to the woman's head as he assaulted her. 
Later, a semen sample taken from her body 
was found, though a DNA database, to 
match the DNA sample taken from King 
during the arrest procedure in 2009. After 
his conviction, King challenged the use of 
the 2009 sample as evidence against him in 
the rape case. 
In agreeing with his challenge, as the 
sampling law applied to him specifically, the 
state cOUli majority ruled that arrested 
individuals have a higher level of privacy 
than those who have actually been 
convicted, that the sample in King's case 
was not necessary to identify him in the 
assault case and thus was used only as a 
basis for investigating him in the earlier rape 
incident, that an arrested individual's 
expectation of privacy in private biological 
information outweighed the state's interest 
in gathering information to solve other 
crimes, and that DNA sampling is more 
intrusive than merely taking a suspect's 
fingerprints so the long-standing legal 
permission to use fingerprint evidence did 
not control in the DNA context. 
The state court majority said that its 
"analysis is influenced by the precept that 
the government must overcome a 
presumption that warrantless, suspicionless 
searches are per se unreasonable .... The 
state bears the burden of overcoming the 
arrestee's presumption of innocence and his 
expectation to be free from biological 
searches. . .. " It found that the expectation 
of privacy was greater for an arrestee than 
for a convicted person, and that the state had 
not overcome that privacy claim by its 
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interest in investigating other crimes. 
The two dissenting judges argued that the 
majority had overstated the privacy interests 
of those arrested and detained in police 
stations. And, they concluded, the 
government's interest in solving crimes far 
outweighed any such privacy interests. A 
swab of the mouth to pick up cells, the 
dissenters said, is "perhaps the least 
intrusive of all seizures" by police. 
The dissenters also accused the majority of 
exaggerating the amount of biological 
information that could be exposed by using 
a DNA sample to get a "hit" to help solve 
another crime. The state law at issue, the 
dissenting opinion said, puts strict limits on 
the use of DNA information, and the kind 
that can be used in criminal cases is only the 
kind of "junk" data that does not disclose 
"intimate genetic information." What a 
DNA sample shows, the dissent said, is 
vitiually identical to the ridges of a 
fingerprint that can only be used to identify 
a specific person, and nothing more. 
The state attorney general, in asking the 
Court of Appeals to reconsider its ruling, or 
at least to stay it pending an appeal to the 
Supreme Court, said that the decision could 
affect state prosecutors' use of evidence that 
could help solve "190 unsolved cases." 
Moreover, that motion contended, DNA 
sampling is used not only to solve unsolved 
crimes, but also helps to exonerate those 
who have been convicted in error and helps 
to eliminate other suspects III an 
investigation. 
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"Highest Court in Maryland Bans Collection of 
DNA at Certain Crime Scenes" 
AFRO 
May 2,2012 
Alexis Taylor 
Police depmiments across Maryland were 
ordered to stop collecting DNA from 
suspects of certain crimes last week, the 
result of a ruling in the state's highest court, 
the Maryland COUli of Appeals. 
The ban applies to cases involving attempted 
or committed violent crimes and burglaries, 
which voids part of the amendments made in 
2008 to the Maryland DNA Collection Act. 
That law previously allowed suspects, not 
just convicted criminals, to have their DNA 
taken and saved in a database for use in later 
crimes. 
"What the police departments were doing 
was taking this DNA and stockpiling it 
when there's no probable cause for the 
extraction of the DNA. That is highly 
unconstitutional in terms of individual rights 
and illegal search and seizure," said 
Baltimore attorney, A. Dwight Petit, who's 
been practicing general law since 1973. 
"In dealing with a very, very conservative 
Supreme Court, it is good to see that our 
state cOUli is adhering to some of the 
Constitutional protections which we as 
citizens deserve. It was a very Constitutional 
ruling." 
The ban stems from the Alonzo Jay King J1'. 
v. State of Maryland case, which highlighted 
fourth amendment rights against illegal 
search and seizures. King's DNA was taken 
from him in a 2009 assault arrest. That DNA 
became key in connecting King to a 2003 
rape, a connection he says would never have 
been made had his DNA not been taken 
before he was convicted of the 2009 assault. 
Though the evidence will be harder to 
obtain, it will still be available to 
investigators after the proper procedures 
have been followed. 
"The court says you can still get the DNA, 
provided you take your facts to a neutral and 
detached magistrate, i.e. a judge, and get a 
warrant. In order to get a warrant you're 
going to have to persuade the judge that this 
DNA is evidence of a certain crime," said 
University of Baltimore, School of Law 
Professor, Byron Warnken. 
Police departments are not in complete 
agreement with the ruling, but are adhering 
to the order, while Attorney General 
Douglas F. Gansler has already requested a 
stay of the decision. 
"The court's decision thereby undermines 
important public safety objectives," said 
Gansler in his motion submitted May 1, 
asking the Maryland Court of Appeals to 
reconsider the decision before the Supreme 
Court is petitioned. 
"The 2008 amendments have bolstered law 
enforcement efforts and have led to the 
apprehension of violent criminals who 
committed crimes that might otherwise have 
gone unsolved." 
Gansler also said that while the 2008 
amendments could bring an end to nearly 
190 unsolved cases, the DNA evidence 
collected also helps exonerate prisoners 
wrongly accused. 
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Whatever the effects of the reversal, 
Maryland State 
Police say their main focus IS keeping 
citizens out of harm's way. 
"We're still able to collect upon conviction, 
what's been halted is collection upon 
arrest," said Elena Russo, a spokesperson for 
the Maryland State Police DepaItment. 
"Our job is public safety and DNA 
collection is a tool. The effects are still to be 
determined," said Russo, when asked if the 
ruling will help or hurt officials pursuing 
justice in the future. 
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"Court of Appeals Holding Could Stop Arrestee DNA Collection 
by State and Local Governments" 
Maryland Association of C01lnties 
April 27, 2012 
Since the passage of the 2008 Maryland 
DNA Collection Act, it has been a common 
practice for State and local law enforcement 
and correctional agencies to take a DNA 
sample from arrestees charged with a violent 
crime or felony burglary. However, an April 
24 Maryland Court of Appeals decision in 
King v. State of Maryland, has held that 
taking a DNA sample from an arrestee 
violates the arrestee's FOUlih Amendment 
right against unreasonable warrantless 
searches. The ruling has put law 
enforcement and correctional agencies in a 
quandary about whether to continue the 
practice pending appeal. 
As reported by an April 25 Baltimore Sun 
article, some State and local jurisdictions 
have decided to continue the practice while 
the State decides whether to appeal the case. 
Several law enforcement agencies, including 
the state Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services, were awaiting a 
decision on whether the state will appeal 
before they make changes. Gov. Matiin 
O'Malley, Baltimore's mayor and a chorus 
of state and local officials called for an 
appeal of what they see as a crucial tool that 
has linked suspects to other, unsolved 
cnmes. 
Opponents of the practice said the decision 
to continue taking samples shows disregard 
for the Court of Appeals and the laws the 
police are sworn to uphold .... 
O'Malley was joined by Baltimore Mayor 
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Police 
Commissioner Frederick H. Bealefeld III 
and others in pushing Attorney General 
Douglas Gansler to file a challenge before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. ... 
In Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties, 
police officials said they would not change 
their practices until the state police or 
Gansler's office told them otherwise; in 
Howard County and Baltimore City, the 
samples are collected by the state public 
safety department, which will continue to do 
so. 
It remained unclear what will happen to the 
nearly 16,000 samples already collected in a 
database, although a public defender said 
suspects whose DNA has been compiled 
may be able to take court action to get the 
samples destroyed .... 
The collection of DNA at arrest has been the 
subject of national debate, because 
opponents point out that it takes place before 
a suspect is tried in court. Twenty-six states 
have laws similar to Maryland's, and many 
have been upheld in state and federal court. 
An April 25 Baltimore Sun editorial urges 
the State to appeal to decision. The editorial 
notes that the Maryland Court of Appeals 
has upheld in the past the taking of 
fingerprints from arrestees and the post-
conviction collection of DNA. 
The crux of the matter is this: Those charged 
with crimes have, for decades, been 
fingerprinted as a matter of routine, and 
those fingerprints are checked against 
evidence both in the crime at hand and in 
unsolved crimes. The use of DNA is more 
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powerful and more technologically 
advanced, but it is fundamentally the same 
thing. We hope the Supreme Court will be 
given the chance to recognize that fact and 
uphold Mr. King's conviction-and the law 
that made it possible. 
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"Police Power to Use Stun Guns Left Unclear" 
SCO TUSb log 
May 29, 2012 
Lyle Denniston 
The Supreme Court, choosing not to review 
a compromise decision of a federal appeals 
court, on Tuesday left police around the 
nation with no final guidance on the legality 
of their use of a Taser-a device that can 
stun an unruly or disobedient suspect into 
immobility, or at least inflict a considerable 
amount of temporary pain. Without 
comment, the Justices turned aside four 
separate petitions, raising both sides of the 
issue: whether such stun guns' use is a kind 
of excessive force by police in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, and whether police 
are entitled to legal immunity for their past 
use of such a device. 
The Court's action settles nothing on either 
question. Thus, police in various parts of the 
country will have to check what the federal 
or state courts in their area have ruled on the 
subject-if they have. As of now, the lower 
cOUlis are split on the constitutionality of 
Taser technology as a method of police 
control. 
In Tuesday's orders, the Court voted to 
leave intact a Ninth Circuit Court ruling 
declaring that it violates the Fourth 
Amendment to use a Taser to subdue a 
suspect, at least when the crime the police 
are investigating is not a serious one, the 
suspect does not pose an immediate threat to 
the safety of officers or bystanders, and the 
suspect is not "actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest" by fleeing. 
Those are not exclusive factors, though, the 
Circuit Court said, and, in fact, it found the 
use of a Taser was excessive even in one 
case where the suspect did mildly resist 
arrest. 
In one case before the Circuit Court, police 
officers in Seattle used three quick bursts of 
a Taser (in the non-demobilizing mode) to 
subdue a pregnant woman who had been 
stopped for driving too fast near a school. In 
the other case, police officers in Maui, 
Hawaii, used a stun gun in its strongest 
mode to disable a woman involved in a 
domestic dispute with her husband. In each 
case, the Circuit Court ruled that the use of 
the technology, in the specific circumstances 
of the two cases, was "unreasonable" in a 
Fourth Amendment sense. 
But, the Circuit Court went on to conclude 
that the FOUlih Amendment right was not 
clearly established at the time of these two 
incidents-November 2004 in the Seattle 
incident, August 2006 in the Maui incident. 
The Justices, without comment, denied 
review of Daman v. Brooks (11-898), 
Agarano v. Mattos (11-1032), Brooks v. 
Daman (11-1045), and Mattos v. Agarano 
(11-1165) .... 
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"Ninth Circuit Lays Out Constitutional 
Limits on Use of Tasers" 
Metropolitan News-Enterprise 
October 18, 2011 
The use of tasers to subdue persons 
suspected of minor offenses is subject to 
constitutional limits on the use of excessive 
force, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled yesterday. 
A sharply divided en banc panel of the court 
reversed two district court rulings that were 
argued together and consolidated for 
decision. The district judge in each instance 
ruled that the plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence for the case to go 
forward under 42 U.S.c. Sec. 1983, but the 
appellate court said the officers in both cases 
were protected by qualified immunity. 
In a case from Seattle, a six-judge majority 
held that a seven-months pregnant woman 
tasered three times after a traffic stop had 
shown a prima facie violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, but that the law at the time of 
the 2004 incident was too unsettled for the 
plaintiff to show a violation of a clearly 
established right. Four judges said the 
plaintiff's bizarre conduct and refusal to 
follow instructions gave the officers no 
reasonable alternative to using the amount of 
force that they did. 
The decision was a partial victory for 
plaintiff Malaika Brooks, however. Because 
the "clearly established right" analysis does 
not apply under Washington state law, the 
court held, she has a viable claim for assault 
and battery. 
Maui Case 
In the second case, from Maui, the same 
seven judges similarly concluded that a 
woman who allegedly interfered with police 
as they attempted to arrest her intoxicated 
husband for attacking her should not have 
been tasered without warning, but that the 
officer was entitled to qualified immunity. 
Two of the other judges argued that Jayzel 
Mattos, like Brooks, left the officers devoid 
of reasonable alternatives to using the 
electric devices. But two judges who 
approved of the officer's conduct in Brooks' 
case argued that Mattos was entitled to a 
trial to determine whether the officer who 
tasered her in August 2006 breached 
constitutional standards that were well-
established at that time. 
The panel that decided the cases consisted of 
10 judges, due to the recent death of Judge 
Pamela Ann Rymer. 
Judge Richard A. Paez, wrItmg for the 
majority, explained that Brooks was cited 
for speeding in a school zone after dropping 
off her l1-year-old for class. After refusing 
to sign the citation, she became involved in 
a heated argument, apparently because she 
disbelieved the officer's explanation that 
signing meant only that she acknowledged 
receipt and was not an admission of guilt. 
After she reiterated to an arriving sergeant 
that she would not sign the citation, she was 
told she was going to jail. After she told the 
officers she was due to give birth in less 
than 60 days, and after an officer threatened 
her with the taser, she testified, an officer 
opened the driver's side door and twisted 
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her arm up behind her back, then removed 
the keys-which dropped to the floor-from 
her ignition. 
Another officer then applied the taser, In 
drive-stun mode, to her left thigh. 
In drive-stun mode, the taser is applied to 
the subject's body; it is a pain-compliance 
technique and is not intended to incapacitate 
the subject. In dart-mode, by contrast, the 
taser fires electrodes capable of 
incapacitating the subject by interrupting the 
ability of the brain to control the muscles in 
the body. 
Brooks-who was convicted of failing to 
sign the ticket, but not of resisting arrest-
sought damages for her injuries, including 
permanent burn scars. 
Domestic Call 
In Mattos' case, the testimony was that 
police responded to the family residence 
after the couple's 14-year-old daughter 
called 911. Mattos claimed that she was 
trying to calm the situation, and avoid 
disturbing a younger child who was 
sleeping, when Officer Ryan Aikala moved 
toward her husband with her in the middle. 
She claimed that the officer pushed up 
against her chest, and that she extended her 
arm to protect her breasts "from being 
smashed against" the officer's body. The 
officer then accused her of touching him, 
and as she tried to reason with another 
officer, she claimed, Aikala shot her with 
the taser in dart-mode. 
All charges against Mattos and her husband 
were ultimately dropped. She and her 
husband alleged in their complaint that the 
warrantless entry into their residence and 
their arrests violated the FOUlih, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth amendments, but all claims 
except those relating to the use of the taser 
were dismissed by the district judge. 
Paez concluded that in Brooks' case, 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the district judge 
was correct in concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence of excessive force. The 
violation, he reasoned, was relatively minor; 
there was no immediate threat to the safety 
of the officers or the public, at least not after 
the keys were removed from the ignition; 
and Brooks was not actively resisting or 
attempting to evade arrest. 
There was, he added, no reason for the 
officer to use the taser against Brooks three 
times within a span of less than a minute. He 
also concluded, however, that Brooks is 
without a federal remedy because at the 
time, there was no Ninth Circuit law on the 
use of tasers and federal courts in other 
circuits had uniformly held that the use of 
the taser did not constitute a constitutional 
violation. 
With respect to Mattos, Paez noted that the 
only offense she was accused of was 
interfering with the officer, that any such 
interference was-according to her version 
of the facts-relatively minor, that the 
officers could not have considered her a 
threat, and that while the situation was 
volatile, there was no evidence "that tasing 
the innocent wife of a large, drunk, angry 
man when there is no threat that either 
spouse has a weapon, is a prudent way to 
defuse a potentially, but not yet, dangerous 
situation. " 
The lack of a warning, he added, "pushes 
this use of force far beyond the pale." 
But in concluding that Mattos, like Brooks, 
cannot pierce the police claim of qualified 
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immunity, Paez explained that as of August 
2006, there was still no federal appellate 
case law holding the use of the taser 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, he 
said, has made it clear that a court cannot 
find a right to be clearly established without 
support in Supreme COUli or federal 
appellate precedent. 
Paez was joined by Judges Susan P. Graber, 
M. Margaret McKeown, Raymond C. 
Fisher, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson. 
Judge Mary M. Schroeder concurred 
separately, emphasizing "the non-
threatening nature of the plaintiffs' 
conduct," in contrast with the danger posed 
by tasering, particularly the risk to Brooks' 
child, although the child was ultimately born 
healthy. 
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, joined by Judge 
Carlos Bea, argued that the majority failed 
to appreciate the difficulty of police work 
and the superiority of the taser to other 
means of subduing suspects that are more 
dangerous to both the officer and the 
suspect. 
The officers in Brooks' case, he wrote, acted 
in a way that was "entirely reasonable," 
"were endlessly patient," and deserved 
"commendations for grace under fire." The 
plaintiff, he said, "is completely, wholly, 
100 percent at fault" because she "risked 
harm to herself, her unborn daughter and 
three police officers because she got her 
dander up over a traffic ticket." 
Kozinski acknowledged that Mattos' case 
was "considerably closer," but argued that 
the decision to use the taser was reasonable 
in the context in which the officer found 
himself, the need to make a split-second 
judgment under a difficult and fast-moving 
situation. 
Judge Barry Silverman, joined by Judge 
Richard Clifton, joined Kozinski's analysis 
of the Brooks case, but said the district 
judge was correct in finding that Mattos had 
a triable case. "Precedent already on the 
books in August 2006 provided officers and 
cOUlis with enough guidance to know that a 
taser in dati mode is not a toy and presents a 
level of force on par with other implements 
'used to subdue violent or aggressive 
persons. ", 
Pasadena attorney John Burton authored an 
amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. 
The cases are Mattos v. Agarano, 08-15567, 
and Brooks v. Daman, 08-35536. 
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"Police Use of Stun Guns May Increase" 
The Sun 
June 10, 2008 
Sarah Garland 
The New York City Police Department 
could expand greatly its use of electric stun 
guns, as Commissioner Raymond Kelly said 
yesterday he is prepared to accept 
recommendations from a new report spurred 
by the 2006 Sean Bell shooting. 
The report, by a nonpartisan, California-
based think tank, RAND Corp., was 
commissioned last year by Mr. Kelly to 
examine police firearms training. 
Although mostly laudatory, the report listed 
more than 100 recommendations for 
improvements, including more hands-on 
instruction and stricter standards for how 
police are taught to handle their weapons. 
The most prominent-and most likely to rile 
police critics-was a recommendation that 
the depatiment launch a pilot study to 
examine whether its more than 27,000 
uniformed officers on patrol should be 
armed with stun guns. 
Of 455 police shootings examined for the 
report, researchers found 25-three of them 
fatal-where a stun gun may have diffused 
the situation. 
"The expansion of the use of Tasers may 
well be in order," the report's lead author, 
Bernard Rostker, said at a news conference 
yesterday announcing the findings. 
The police depatiment had already 
announced it is deploying 500 Tasers to 
sergeants on patrol staliing tomorrow, and 
Mr. Kelly said he was open to expanding the 
program. 
Yet the commissioner also noted that the use 
of Tasers in New York has been limited in 
the past because they have been known to 
cause deaths. 
"They're controversial," he said. 
The guns shoot out metal barbs that lodge in 
the skin of suspects and the models used by 
the police department have the capacity to 
transmit 5,000 volts of electricity into the 
human body, according to Taser spokesman 
Steve Tuttle. 
In its other main recommendation, the report 
called for rolling enrollment for the police 
academy, instead of the current system of 
two large classes of recruits a year, so that 
recruits can have more chances to practice 
firearms training. 
Police officials said a new police academy 
due to open in the next few years would 
allow the police depatiment to apply many 
of the report's training recommendations. 
The report was originally billed as a six-
month study of the NYPD's firearms 
training that would include a look at 
"contagious shooting" after Bell, an 
unarmed black man, was killed in a hail of 
50 police bullets. 
But on the subject of contagious firing-
when police officers fire reflexively, often in 
response to the sounds of guns going off 
around them-the report said it had been 
nearly impossible to tabulate whether 
incidents had risen or fallen in recent years. 
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"It's a very rare event," Mr. Rostker said. 
The associate legal director at the New York 
Civil Liberties Union, Chris Dunn, criticized 
the report's treatment of contagious 
shootings as cursory, and also questioned its 
lack of a systematic analysis of the ethnic 
makeup of shooting victims and firing 
officers. 
"It's really silent on the issues that the Bell 
shooting raised," Mr. Dunn said. 
Mr. Rostker called the omission of race and 
ethnicity "an oversight," adding that he was 
"sorry about that." 
Mr. Kelly said the issue of race was not in 
the purview of the report. 
"This was study was focused on what we 
could do. It was not a panacea; it wasn't 
going to solve all issues," he said. 
427 
"Shoot to Stun" 
The New York Times 
July 2, 2008 
Paul Robinson 
A narrowly divided Supreme Court ruled 
last week that the Second Amendment gives 
Americans the right to keep a loaded gun at 
home for their personal use. Presumably, 
citizens can use these weapons to defend 
themselves from intruders. But given the 
growing effectiveness and availability of 
less lethal weapons, it is likely that state 
laws will increasingly keep people from 
actually using their guns for self-defense. 
The states impose carefully defined 
limitations on the use of deadly force in self-
defense. (These rules are fairly uniform, 
state to state; most are based on the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 
of 1962.) A person may use only as much 
force as is "immediately necessary." If a less 
lethal means of defense is available, the use 
of deadly force is illegal. Firearms are by 
law deadly force. (The police are given 
somewhat greater authority to use force, 
even aggressive force.) 
Guns have been considered a primary 
weapon for self-defense. But now there are 
nonlethal alternatives-some not yet on the 
market-that can quickly disable an attacker 
even more reliably than a firearm can. 
The best known of these are Tasers, 
handgun-shaped devices that fire a dart that 
delivers a painful electrical shock. A hit 
from a Taser causes an instant muscular 
spasm that can disable any attacker, no 
matter how determined. And the Taser 
works no matter where on the attacker's 
body the dart hits. A bullet, in contrast, 
instantly disables only if it hits a couple of 
vulnerable spots, like the space between the 
eyes. A shot to the arm, the leg or even the 
torso may not stop an attacker. 
A Taser works only within a limited 
distance, up to 35 feet for advanced models. 
But most firearm confrontations are at less 
than 10 feet. More important, the legal 
limitations on self-defense typically do not 
allow use of force at a distance. Defensive 
force is considered "immediately necessary" 
only when the defender can wait no longer, 
when the threat is "imminent." 
Newer kinds of hand-held weapons that are 
less lethal than guns-many already in 
prototype-may be even more effective than 
Tasers. These include light lasers, designed 
to blind temporarily, and microwave beams 
that instantly cause the skin to feel as if it is 
on fire, but cause no lasting harm. 
Of course, anyone who uses a gun in self-
defense may argue that he would have used 
a less lethal weapon if he had had one at 
hand, but there was only the firearm. The 
problem with this argument is that the 
limited option is the person's choice, and the 
law may not be blind to that choice. 
If you are a surgeon and you leave your 
glasses behind on the way to the operating 
room, then botch a delicate procedure, you 
can't convince a judge that the resulting 
death wasn't your fault because you couldn't 
see well. If, on your way to confront an 
intruder, you choose your gun rather than 
your more effective but less lethal weapon, 
you can hardly complain later about your 
limited options. 
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Similarly, when a person shops for a weapon 
of self-defense, anticipating some day a 
confrontation with an attacker, his choice of 
a gun over something less lethal but more 
effective is a choice to limit his options in a 
confrontation. 
Should we worry that by expecting people to 
use only nonlethal weapons in self-defense 
we would sacrifice our personal autonomy 
and safety? No. On the contrary, personal 
autonomy would be even more vigilantly 
protected. 
The reason for this is a second limitation on 
the use of defensive force, what might be 
called the "proportionality" requirement. 
Typically, a defender can lawfully use 
deadly force only to prevent death, rape, 
kidnapping or bodily injury serious enough 
to cause long-term loss or impairment of a 
body part or organ. But a nondeadly weapon 
can be used to defend against any threat of 
unlawful force. 
As effective less-than-Iethal weapons 
proliferate, the laws of self-defense may 
ultimately relegate last week's court 
decision to the status of an odd little 
opinion, one that works mainly to ensure 
some special constitutional status for 
gunpowder technology. Gun collectors will 
be fond of it, but for most of society, it will 
have little practical effect. 
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